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Article 4

An Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe
Steven G. Calabresi ∗ & Lena M. Barsky ∗∗
This Article offers a defense of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Plyler
v. Doe based on the original public meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it was enacted in 1868. We argue that at that time,
the Fourteenth Amendment granted certain rights, such as life, liberty,
and possession of personal property, to immigrants under the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, but did not grant them the privileges
and immunities of citizenship (e.g. all civil rights and the political right
to vote). We also argue that public education is a right of all persons
protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and was
protected at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. We
thus conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment granted a free public
school education to both citizens and immigrants from July 9,
1868, onward.
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 227
II. THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF THE TEXTS:
RIGHTS AFFORDED TO ALIENS....................................... 231

∗

Clayton J. and Henry R. Barber Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Visiting
Professor of Law, Yale University, and Visiting Professor of Political Theory, Brown
University. We would like to begin by thanking John Tomasi, the Brown University Political
Science Department, the Political Theory Project, and Northwestern Law School for creating
the working environment that made it possible for us to write this Article. We have also
benefitted from the comments of Dan Rodriguez, Erin Delaney, and of students who read this
article in draft at Roger Williams University School of Law. We would also like to acknowledge
the work of John Harrison, whose article, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992), shed new light on the Fourteenth Amendment and has helped
shape our philosophy about the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning. Without his research, we
could not have written this Article.
∗∗
B.A., 2014, Brown University. Program Associate at the National Judicial Education
Program, a project of Legal Momentum in cooperation with the National Association of
Women Judges.

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

A. Citizenship and the Privileges & Immunities Clause ....... 235
B. Due Process and Equal Protection for “[A]ny
[P]erson” ........................................................................... 238
C. The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause........... 240
D. The Original Meaning of the Equal Protection Clause .. 246
E. Original Meaning and Public Education for Illegal
Aliens .................................................................................. 249
III. THE HISTORY OF THE ACT AND THE A MENDMENT:
C ITIZENSHIP VERSUS ALIENAGE .................................... 250
A. Legislative History Behind the Fourteenth
Amendment ....................................................................... 250
1. Civil rights, “inhabitants,” and the origins of the
equal protection doctrine ........................................... 250
2. Constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ...... 256
3. Congress debates rights granted to aliens .................. 258
4. Finalizing the Fourteenth Amendment text .............. 262
5. Ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment ....................... 266
B. What, Exactly, Does “Within Its Jurisdiction” Mean? ..... 270
C. “Within Its Jurisdiction” and Native American
Sovereignty ........................................................................ 276
D. Immigration During the Reconstruction Period: No
Federal Laws, “Legal,” or “Illegal” ................................. 279
E. Aliens: Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Since
Its Inception ...................................................................... 287
F. Public Education: A Right, Not a Privilege....................... 297
1. Public education in Texas in 1869 .............................. 297
2. Plyler v. Doe oral argument........................................... 301
IV. OTHER FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ALIENAGE CASES ..... 305
A. Yick Wo v. Hopkins ............................................................... 306
B. Truax v. Raich...................................................................... 308
C. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission .............................. 311
D. Graham v. Richardson ........................................................ 314
E. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong ................................................ 316
F. Nyquist v. Mauclet ................................................................ 320
G. Arizona v. United States ..................................................... 322
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 328

226

225

An Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe
“I submit that, when it declares that no State shall deprive any person
of the equal protection of the laws, it means substantially that no person
shall be deprived by a State of the equal benefit of the laws; that the word
‘protection,’ as there used, means not simply the protection of the person
from violence, the protection of his property from destruction, but it is
substantially in the sense of the equal benefit of the law . . . .” 1
“The object of a Constitution is not only to confer power upon the
majority, but to restrict the power of the majority and to protect the
rights of the minority.” 2

I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Plyler v. Doe that state laws and
regulations that discriminated against illegal aliens should be subject
to the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause. 3 In Plyler,
a group of Mexican children who had illegally entered the United
States with their families and who were living in Texas “complained of
the exclusion . . . from the public schools of the Tyler Independent
School District.” 4 These children had been excluded from a free
public-school education under a May 1975 revision to Texas’s
education laws, 5 which allowed local school districts to “deny
enrollment in their public schools to children not ‘legally admitted’ to
the country.” 6 The Court held, in an opinion written by Justice
Brennan, “If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children
the free public education that it offers to other children residing within
its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers
some substantial state interest. No such showing was made here.” 7 In
other words, the children’s status as illegal aliens did not, by itself,
afford the State a sufficient rational basis for denying them the benefit

1. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872) (statement of Sen. Morton, R-IN).
2. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Hotchkiss, R-NY).
3. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
4. Id. at 206.
5. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1995) (repealed 1995) (current version at
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.001), declared unconstitutional by Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982).
6. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205 (quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1981)
(repealed 1995) (current version at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.001)).
7. Id. at 230.
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of a public school education that was afforded as of right to other
children in Texas who were not illegal aliens. 8
The Supreme Court said that no national policy goals were served
by allowing Texas to deny children who were illegal aliens an
elementary school education and that the statute did not further any
substantial state goal. 9 With Plyler, as with other cases discussed in this
Article, the Court essentially followed a Lochnerian approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment even though it used the post-New Deal
rational basis test and the concept of “strict scrutiny.” The Court has
decided other cases regarding the rights of aliens (noncitizens) against
state governments along similar lines. 10 Our goal here is to determine
if Plyler v. Doe and other U.S. Supreme Court precedents dealing with
discrimination by the states on the basis of alienage are consistent with
the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was
understood when it was ratified in 1868.
Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation that has
been championed by the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia, 11 Justice Clarence Thomas, former Judge Robert H. Bork,12
and former Attorney General Edwin Meese III. 13 Professor Calabresi
has also commented on originalism in a law review article titled
Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 14 and our comments here draw
on and paraphrase that article in various places.

8. See id. at 228–30. A note on verbiage: In using the term “illegal alien,” we do not
mean to disparage these children in any way and are merely following both popular word usage
and the language used in Plyler. We reject that term and its negative connotations; however,
because of the historical documents and case law quoted in this Article, we must use the term to
some extent. In using the phrase “illegal alien,” we do not intend to offend any of our readers,
and we ourselves favor immigration reform.
9. Id. at 227–28.
10. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Part IV, we analyze these
cases using the same originalist theory applied to Plyler v. Doe.
11. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997).
12. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990).
13. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER
CENTURY OF DEBATE 99, 99–109 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
14. Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1393.
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Originalism posits that the constitutional text should be
interpreted according to the original public meaning of the words
when the Constitution, or its amendments, were ratified. Since the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that we determine
what the amendment meant objectively to reasonable readers of
American English in 1868. This “original public meaning” can be
uncovered by looking at dictionaries, grammar books, and other
benchmarks of objective public meaning that were publicly available
in 1868. 15
Many critics of originalism, such as Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein,
Jack Balkin, and Michael Klarman, claim that a key weakness of the
Scalia-Thomas theory of judging is its supposed inability to explain
and justify a number of post-1954 foundational Fourteenth
Amendment cases. 16 Among the Fourteenth Amendment cases that
originalism allegedly cannot explain are Brown v. Board of Education;17
Loving v. Virginia; 18 United States v. Virginia 19 (more commonly
known as the VMI sex discrimination case); and Trimble v. Gordon,20
which applied the Equal Protection Clause to classifications based on
illegitimacy. These cases all grew out of the famous “footnote four” in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 21 In that case, the Supreme
Court repudiated Lochnerian-style judicial activism 22 except when it

15. See supra notes 11–13.
16. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2004); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005);
see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
20. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
21. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
22. During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court balanced civil rights, like liberty of
contract, against the state governments’ police power to pass just laws for the general good of
the people. The Supreme Court asked in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), whether a
sixty-hour workweek limitation imposed on bakers was reasonable given the health hazards
associated with being a baker. The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that the New York
law was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. Id.
In 1938, in Caroline Products, the Supreme Court declared that henceforth it would not ask if
economic or social regulation was unreasonable but only whether it had some “rational basis.”
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was protecting (1) rights secured in the federal Bill of Rights; (2)
rights of discrete and insular minorities who were the victims of
prejudice; and (3) access to the democratic process. It has long been
assumed that federal judicial protection of discrete and insular
minorities who are not U.S. citizens—like illegal aliens—is a form of
Lochnerian judicial activism that is inconsistent with the rational
basis test and the Constitution. That assumption turns out to be
deeply
mistaken under our originalist interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A proper application of Scalia-style originalism and textualism
shows that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe was
correctly decided based on the original public meaning of the words
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. We begin our analysis in Part
I by discussing the historical origins and the original public meaning
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. We
show that the Reconstruction framers specifically considered how and
whether to protect illegal aliens in both the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the Fourteenth Amendment. They used great care in defining
both the differences and the similarities between the rights granted to
citizens and to illegal aliens during Reconstruction.
In Part II, we turn to a discussion of the original public meaning
of the text of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth
Amendment to show why the 1975 Texas statute discriminating
against children who were illegal aliens was unconstitutional. We show
how noncitizens were in fact given Fourteenth Amendment
protections in the text of the Amendment and why the children of
illegal aliens have a right to a public-school education today. To
analyze the text in an originalist fashion, we make heavy use of
dictionaries that would have been available to the American general
public in the 1860s. Our argument rests on the textual analysis, but in
Part III we provide context, by explaining the history of the act and
amendment, for the word choices of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

403 U.S. at 152–53. From 1938 to 1969, the Supreme Court found a rational basis for every
law it considered except for laws in three categories, which footnote four of Carolene Products
held were entitled to heightened scrutiny: (1) state laws that violated a right listed in the U.S.
Bill of Rights; (2) laws closing off the political channels of change, such as incumbent protection
measures; and (3) laws discriminating against religious, racial, linguistic or other discrete and
insular minorities. Id. at 152 n.4.
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Finally, Part IV addresses other cases in which the Supreme Court
has struck down state laws that discriminated against aliens 23 and how
our originalist analysis supports those decisions. We do not address
more recent concerns about federalism as applied to illegal alienage in
this Article because that debate raises distinct issues that rely primarily
on the text of the Constitution itself and not its amendments. This
Article focuses only on the Fourteenth Amendment and state action
discriminating against aliens.
II. THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF THE TEXTS: RIGHTS
AFFORDED TO ALIENS
Scalia-style originalism revolves around the importance of a law’s
historical origins and the original public meaning of the law’s text at
the time of enactment. A lawmaker’s intent is not necessarily indicative
of what the words of a law actually meant to the American people
when the law was adopted. As Professor Calabresi and Andrea
Matthews explain, suppose Congress passed a law decreeing that the
colors of the American flag should be red, white, and blue, but
members of Congress believed, and intended, that the word “blue”
actually meant the color “green.” The flag would still be red, white,
and blue, contrary to congressional intent, because the American
public would have understood the word “blue” to mean the color
“blue” and not the color “green.” 24 The original public meaning of
the law—the public meaning of the text when it was enacted—is
controlling for originalists.
The difference between original intent and original public
meaning is foundational to the argument that Plyler v. Doe conforms
to the original meaning of the Fourteen Amendment. Explaining how
his theory differs from that of original intent, Justice
Scalia commented,
The theory of originalism treats a constitution like a statute, and
gives it the meaning that its words were understood to bear at the
time they were promulgated. You will sometimes hear it described as
the theory of original intent. You will never hear me refer to original
intent, because as I say I am first of all a textualist, and secondly an
originalist. If you are a textualist, you don’t care about the intent,

23. See supra note 10 for a list of the specific cases.
24. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1397.
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and I don’t care if the framers of the Constitution had some secret
meaning in mind when they adopted its words. I take the words as
they were promulgated to the people of the United States, and what
is the fairly understood meaning of those words. 25

Justice Scalia, after searching for general decision-making rules,
offered “his Golden Rule for decision making”:
The words are the law. I think that’s what is meant by a government
of laws, not of men. We are bound not by the intent of our
legislators, but by the laws which they enacted, which are set forth
in words, of course. As I say, until recently this was constitutional
orthodoxy. Everyone at least said . . . that the Constitution was that
anchor, that rock, that unchanging institution that forms the
American polity. Immutability was regarded as its characteristic.
What it meant when it was adopted it means today, and its meaning
doesn’t change just because we think that meaning is no longer
adequate to our times. 26

The rationale underlying Scalia’s theory is, quite simply, that
lawmaking in a constitutional democracy like ours is a public act.
Citizens cannot participate in the democratic process or lobby their
elected representatives if proposed legal texts have secret or private
meanings that are unknown to the general public. Members of
Congress cannot know when to propose amendments to a law, and
the President cannot know whether to sign or veto a law, if the law
has a secret meaning that can be discerned only by looking at what
one or a few lawmakers “intended.” It is hard enough to figure out
what one individual may have intended in, say, a criminal case; figuring
out what groups of people—like the Reconstruction Congress—
intended is hopeless. We can determine what the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment meant in 1868 and, in a general way, what
problem it was meant to correct, but there is no coherent method to
determine what the framers and ratifiers of that Amendment intended.
The best indicia of the original public meaning of the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment are found in the dictionaries and grammar
books that were widely used at the time the amendment was ratified. 27
Newspaper editorials from that time period may also be used to

25. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 246 (2014).
26. Id.
27. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1396.
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recover the objective “original public meaning of a newly enacted legal
text” and to understand some of the public events that caused
Congress to propose the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 It is important,
however, to keep in mind that newspaper editorials are, in part, public
interpretations of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. They can
be beneficial, but it is important when analyzing the Amendment to
start with the dictionary definitions of the words that the Amendment
uses. Dictionary definitions express the social meaning of a word;
newspaper editorials may perform a similar task, but they may also be
biased. Conversely, congressional legislative history is notoriously
unreliable because members of Congress have powerful incentives to
overstate or understate what the text of a particular proposed
act means.
We begin here by analyzing the text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment using Noah Webster’s authoritative American Dictionary
of the English Language. Webster published the first edition of his
dictionary in 1828, after taking nearly twenty years to finish it. 29 The
volume contained 70,000 words and included 40,000 more
definitions than had ever before been published in an English
dictionary. 30 The edition we use to deduce the Fourteenth
Amendment’s original public meaning is one published in 1848—five
years after Webster’s death in 1843—by Chauncey A. Goodrich, a
professor at Yale University, who changed the dictionary only slightly,
in accordance with Webster’s own plans: “[T]o present, on a reduced
scale, a clear, accurate, and full exhibition of the American Dictionary
in all its parts,” to “[make] it a Synonymous Dictionary,” and to
update the definitions surrounding words relating to art and science.31

28. Id.
29. Joshua Lawrence Eason, Dictionary-Making in the English Language, 5 PEABODY J.
EDUC., 347, 352 (1928).
30. Id.
31. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, at iii
(Chauncey A. Goodrich ed., 1848). Goodrich writes in his preface:
The plan of this abridgement, as made under the author’s direction in 1829, by
Joseph E. Worcester, Esq., of Cambridge, Mass., is thus stated in the original preface:
‘The leading and most etymologies, as given in the quarto edition, are here retained.
The definitions remain unaltered, except by an occasional compression in their
statement. All the significations of words as exhibited in the larger work are here
retained, but the illustrations and authorities are generally omitted. In doubtful or
contested cases, however, they are carefully retained.’ In accordance with this plan,
Dr. Webster directed the additions and alterations of the larger work, in the edition
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It may seem that, due to the Civil War and the immense amount of
upheaval it brought to the country, definitions would have changed
between 1848 and 1866, when the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
passed and the process of drafting the Fourteenth Amendment
began. 32 This claim, however, is unfounded—three different versions
of Webster’s dictionary—1828, 1848, and 1867—all define the word
“person,” 33 a critical word in the Fourteenth Amendment, in the same
way, indicating continuity in definitions between 1848 and 1866. 34

of 1840, to be inserted in this abridgment. This was done at the time, as far as possible,
by means of an appendix; and is now more perfectly accomplished by carrying all the
improvements then made into their proper places in the body of the work. The
subsequent improvements of the larger work, down to the period of the author’s
death, have also been introduced, in substance, to this edition, under the heads to
which they belong. The present revision has been extended equally to both the works,
and the results have been embodied in each, on the principles stated above, in their
due proportion. By these successive revisions a very great amount of valuable matter
has been added to this abridgement. It is now made, in all important respects,
consistent with the larger work, and is designed to present, on a reduced scale, a clear,
accurate, and full exhibition of the American Dictionary in all its parts.
One new feature is now added to this volume, by making it a Synonymous
Dictionary. . . . Under each of the important words, all others having the same general
signification are arranged together, except in cases where they have been previously
exhausted in framing the definitions. This arrangement, it is hoped, will be found of
frequent use even to those practiced in composition; while it will afford important aid
to young writers in attaining grace, variety, and copiousness of diction.
The chief value of a dictionary consists in its definitions,—in giving a clear, full,
and accurate exhibition of all the various shades of meaning which belong, by
established usage, to the words of a language. It is in this respect especially, that Dr.
Webster’s Dictionary has been generally considered superior to every other, both of
this country and of England. To this point, therefore, the labors of the editor have
been mainly directed. No efforts have been spared to obtain the most recent and
valuable works, not only in lexicography, but in the various departments of art and
science embraced in the American Dictionary. As these subjects are in a state of
continual progress, every important word, in its various applications, has been
diligently examined and compared with the statements made on each topic by the
latest and most approved authorities.
Id.
32. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1425.
33. We chose to compare the word “person” because it is the word most crucial to our
originalist analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe that the framers’ choice to use the
word “person,” as opposed to “citizen” or some other specific word, extends the rights afforded
under the Equal Protection Clause to noncitizens as well as citizens, because both are people.
34. Webster’s 1828 edition of his dictionary supplies the following definition, in part,
for “person”:
1. An individual human being consisting of body and soul. We apply the word
to living beings only, possessed of a rational nature; the body when dead is not called
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The full text of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 35

A. Citizenship and the Privileges & Immunities Clause
The first clause, known as the Citizenship Clause, applies only to
citizens of the United States and can in no way be construed to apply
to aliens. We know this because Webster defines the word “citizen” in
the following manner:

a person. It is applied alike to a man, woman or child. . . . 2. A man, woman or child,
considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them. . . . 3. A human being,
considered with respect to the living body or corporeal existence only. . . . 4. A human
being, indefinitely; one; a man. . . . 5. A human being represented in dialogue, fiction,
or on the stage; character.
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) [hereinafter
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY]. Webster’s 1848 version gives a nearly word-for-word replication
of the 1828 definition:
1. An individual human being, consisting of body and soul. 2. A man, woman,
or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them. 3. A human being,
considered with respect to the living body or corporeal existence only. 4. A human
being, indefinitely; one; an individual; a man. 5. A human being represented in
dialogue, fiction, or on the stage; character.
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 734 (Chauncey A.
Goodrich ed., 1848) [hereinafter WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY]. And, finally, the definition
provided in Webster’s 1867 version, which is also remarkably similar, states:
1. An individual human being, consisting of body and soul. 2. A man, woman,
or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them. 3. A human being,
considered with respect to the living body or corporeal existence only. 4. A human
being, indefinitely; one; an individual; a man. 5. A human being represented in
dialogue, fiction, or on the stage: character.
NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 734 (Chauncey A.
Goodrich ed., 1867). The word “person” was not the only word examined—all words defined
using the 1848 edition of Webster’s dictionary were looked up in the 1828 and 1867 versions
of the dictionary. For the words defined in this article, there is little, if any, change between the
three different versions of each word. Oftentimes, a definition is expanded upon as time goes
on, but the meaning of the word defined remains unchanged.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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1. A native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and
privileges of the city in which he resides. 2. A townsman; a man of
trade; not a gentleman. 3. An inhabitant; a dweller in any city, town,
or place. 4. In a general sense, a native or permanent resident in a city
or country. 5. In the United States, a person, native or naturalized,
who has the privileges of exercising the elective franchise, and of
purchasing and holding real estate. 36

One might point out that definitions two and three could be used
to describe aliens; however, definitions one, four, and five clearly
indicate that Webster, and, as such, the American public as a whole,
would have understood the word “citizen” in 1868 to apply only to
an individual born in (or naturalized by) the United States. People
continue to understand the word that way even today. There is a key
difference between the word “citizen” and the word “inhabitant,”
which Webster uses both in his first and third definitions of the word
“citizen.” Webster defines an “inhabitant” as
1. A dweller; one who dwells or resides permanently in a place, or
who has a fixed residence, as distinguished from an occasional lodger
or visitor. 2. One who has a legal settlement in a town, city,
or parish. 37

36. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 177. The definition of “citizen” as
given by Webster’s 1828 dictionary is:
1. The native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privileges
of the city in which he resides; the freeman of a city, as distinguished from a foreigner,
or one not entitled to its franchises. 2. A townsman; a man of trade; not a gentleman.
3. An inhabitant; a dweller in any place. 4. In a general sense, a native or permanent
resident in a city or country; as in the citizens of London or Philadelphia; the citizens
of the United States. 5. In the U. States, a person, native, or naturalized, who has the
privilege of exercising the elective franchise, or the qualifications which enable him to
vote for rulers, and to purchase and hold real estate.
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34.
37. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 542. The 1828 Webster definition is:
A dweller; one who dwells or resides permanently in a place, or who has a fixed
residence, as distinguished from an occasional lodger or visitor; as the inhabitant of a
house or cottage; the inhabitants of a town, city, county or state. So brute animals are
inhabitants of the regions to which their natures are adapted; and we speak of spiritual
beings, as inhabitants of heaven. 2. One who has a legal settlement in a town, city or
parish. The conditions or qualifications which constitute a person an inhabitant of a
town or parish, so as to subject the town or parish to support him, if a pauper, are
defined by the statutes of different governments or states.
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34.
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The word “inhabitant” thus denotes the physical action of living
somewhere on a permanent basis, but it did not apply only to citizens
in 1868. Travelers on a lengthy, yearlong vacation in the United States
are denizens, or inhabitants of the United States, even though they
are not citizens. Article IV of the Articles of Confederation made “all
of the free inhabitants” of the United States citizens—“paupers,
vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted.” 38 It is for this reason
that in five of the original thirteen states, free African Americans were
citizens and could vote. The generous language of the Articles of
Confederation about extending citizenship to all free inhabitants was
dropped in the Constitution, which gave Congress the power to pass
naturalization laws.
A citizen is usually an inhabitant of his or her nation, although
some U.S. citizens may and do live abroad for a period of time. Thus,
“inhabitants” of the United States may also be U.S. citizens, but only
if they were born in the United States or naturalized by the U.S.
government. Inhabitants of the United States may well be foreigners
and noncitizens. Had the Fourteenth Amendment used the word
“inhabitant,” in place of the word “citizen,” Section 1 could have
included aliens in the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. 39 Instead, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
says, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” 40 Thus, it is
clear that aliens have no protection under either the Citizenship
Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The “privileges or immunities” granted to native-born
or naturalized Americans simply do not apply to aliens. In fact,
Webster himself drives this point home, defining the word alien as

38. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV.
39. For further discussion of this idea, see infra Part II. The Articles of Confederation, in
fact, used the word “inhabitants” in its prototypical Privileges and Immunities Clause, which
most probably was intended to include noncitizens living in the states at the time of its framing
and ratification. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. The Clause reads
in part:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different States of this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States,
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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“[a] foreigner; one born in, or belonging to, another country; one
who is not entitled to the privileges of a citizen.” 41 As such, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause cannot be used to defend the children
of illegal aliens in Plyler v. Doe.
B. Due Process and Equal Protection for “[A]ny [P]erson”
The second sentence of Section 1, however, contains two clauses
that protect all “persons” and are thus relevant to aliens or
noncitizens. Both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly apply to all persons, and
thus the cornerstone of our argument throughout this Article will be
that those clauses confer upon alien children the right to a publicschool education recognized in Plyler v. Doe. This text provides that
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 42 Webster’s dictionary
defines the word “any,” which appears in both the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause as “1. One, indefinitely. 2. Some; an
indefinite number, plurally. 3. Some; an indefinite quantity; a small
portion. 4. It is often used as a substitute, the person or thing being
understood. It is used in opposition to none.” 43
As Webster’s definitions illustrate, the word “any” in the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses indicates a degree of
indefiniteness. Likewise, “anything” is a modern-day compound word
that, defined loosely, means “a wide range of things” (e.g., “Billy
loved his dog more than anything in the world”); “anywhere” refers
to some sort of unspecified location (e.g., “Bored to tears, Lisa wanted

41. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 28. Webster’s 1828 dictionary
provides the following definition: “[a] foreigner; one born in, or belonging to, another country;
one who is not a denizen, or entitled to the privileges of a citizen.” WEBSTER, 1828
DICTIONARY, supra note 34.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
43. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 48. The definition in 1828, as
provided by Webster’s dictionary, was:
1. One indefinitely. . . . 2. Some; an indefinite number, plurally; for though the
word is formed from one, it often refers to many. Are there any witnesses present?
The sense seems to be a small, uncertain number. 3 Some; an indefinite quantity; a
small portion. . . . 4. It is often used as a substitute, the person or thing being
understood. . . . It is used in opposition to none.
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34.
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to be anywhere but her cubicle”). 44 When the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses use the word “any” to modify the word “person,”
it has that same indefinite connotation. States may not deprive just
one type of person life, liberty, and property, nor may they deny just
one type of person the equal protection of the laws. The Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses apply to every single type of person—any
person—as opposed to only certain types of people. Illegal aliens and
their children fall under the broad category of “every single type of
person,” and as such states must give them the protections of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
The key distinction between the Citizenship and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses and the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses is that the latter two Clauses use the word person rather than
citizen. Webster defines the word “person” in the following
(painstakingly detailed) manner:
1. An individual human being, consisting of body and soul. 2. A
man, woman, or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct
from them. 3. A human being, considered with respect to the living
body or corporeal existence only. 4. A human being, indefinitely;
one; an individual; a man. 5. A human being represented in dialogue,
fiction, or on the stage; character. 6. Character of office.—7.
Formerly, the parson or minster of a parish.—8. In grammar, the
subject of a verb; the agent that performs, or the patient that suffers,
any thing affirmed by a verb; as, I, thou, he. Also, that modification
of the verb which is used in connection with the subject.—9. In law,
an artificial person is a corporation or body politic.—In person, by
one’s self; with bodily presence; not by representative. 45

44. The New Oxford American Dictionary gives the following definition for “anything”:
[usu. with negative or in questions] used to refer to a thing, no matter what:
nobody was saying anything | have you found anything? | he inquired whether there was
anything he could do. • [without negative] used for emphasis: I was ready for anything.
• used to indicate a range: he trains anything from seven to eight hours a day.
NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 71 (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d
ed. 2010). The same dictionary gives the following for “anywhere”:
[usu. with negative or in questions] in or to any place: he couldn’t be found
anywhere. . . . [without negative] used for emphasis: I could go anywhere in the
world. . . . used to indicate a range: this iron garden seat dates anywhere from 1890
to 1920 | she could have been anywhere between twenty-five and forty.
Id.
45. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 734. See supra note 34 for definitions
of the word in both 1828 and 1864 according to Webster’s dictionaries published in those years.

239

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

Aliens resident in the United States are not citizens, but they are
without question persons under Webster’s definition of the word
person, which includes: (1) “individual human beings,” (2) “man,
woman, or child,” and (3) “human being[s], considered with respect
to the living body.” 46 Since aliens, legal or illegal, qualify as people
under Webster’s 1848 definition, the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
apply to aliens and applied to them in 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.
C. The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause
Now that we know that the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to aliens,
we must parse the text of those Clauses to fully understand their
significance. The Due Process Clause says that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”47
Let’s begin by looking at the original public meaning of the words of
this Clause both in a general sense and more specifically in the context
of Plyler v. Doe. The first important word here is “deprive,” which
Webster defines as follows:
1. To take from; to take away something possessed or enjoyed;
as, to deprive of one’s rights. 2. To hinder from possessing or
enjoying; as, “deprived of his blessed countenance.”—Milton. 3. To
free or release from; [obs.] 4. To divest of an ecclesiastical preferment,
dignity, or office; to divest of orders.—Syn. To strip; bereave; rob;
despoil; debar; abridge; divest. 48

This part of the Due Process Clause makes clear that a state may
not take something away from any person.

46. Id.
47. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
48. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 282. In 1828, Webster defined the
word as meaning:
1. To take from; to bereave of something possessed or enjoyed; followed by of;
as, to deprive a man of sight; to deprive one of strength, of reason, or of property. 2.
To hinder from possessing or enjoying; to debar. . . . [This use of the word is not
legitimate, but common.] 3. To free or release from. 4. To divest of an ecclesiastical
preferment, dignity, or office; to divest of orders; as a bishop, prebend or vicar.
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34.
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Next, we need to define exactly what the states may not deprive
any person of. The first item mentioned by the Due Process Clause is
“life.” Webster’s dictionary defines “life” as follows:
1. In a general sense, that state of animals and plants, or of an
organized being, in which its natural functions and motions are or
may be performed.—2. In animals, animation; vitality; and in man,
that state of being in which the soul and body are united. . . . 4. The
present state of existence; the time from birth to death. 5. Manner
of living; conduct; deportment in regard to morals; as, an honest life.
6. Condition; course of living, in regard to happiness and misery. 49

Thus, in the Fourteenth Amendment sense of the word, “life” can
refer to both the state of being alive and a person’s “manner of living.”
And, just as the Due Process Clause says that a state cannot deprive
a person of his or her “life,” a state also cannot deprive a person of his
or her “liberty.” Webster defines “liberty” as meaning:
1. Freedom from restraint, in a general sense, and applicable to
the body, or to the will or mind.—2. Natural liberty consists in the
power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control,
except from the laws of nature.—3. Civil liberty is the liberty of men
in a state of society, or natural liberty, so far only abridged and
restrained as is necessary and expedient for the safety and interest of
the society, state, or nation. . . . 7. Privilege; exemption; immunity
enjoyed by prescription or by grant: with a plural. 8. Leave; license;
permission granted. . . . 10. Freedom of action or speech beyond the
ordinary bounds of civility or decorum.—To take the liberty to do or
49. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 595. The 1828 version of Webster’s
dictionary supplies the following definition, in part:
1. In a general sense, that state of animals and plants, or of an organized being,
in which its natural functions and motions are performed, or in which its organs are
capable of performing their functions. A tree is not destitute of life in winter, when
the functions of its organs are suspended; nor man during a swoon or syncope; nor
strictly birds, quadrupeds or serpents during their torpitude in winter. They are not
strictly dead, till the functions of their organs are incapable of being renewed. 2. In
animals, animation; vitality; and in man, that state of being in which the soul and
body are united. . . . 4. The present state of existence; the time from birth to death.
The life of man seldom exceeds seventy years. 5. Manner of living; conduct;
deportment, in regard to morals. 6. Condition; course of living, in regard to happiness
and misery. We say, a man’s life has been a series of prosperity, or misfortune. . . . 10.
Spirit; animation; briskness; vivacity; resolution. . . . 13. General state of man, or of
social manners; as the studies and arts that polish life. 14. Condition; rank in society;
as high life and low life.
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34.
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say any thing, to use freedom not specially granted.—To set at liberty,
to deliver from confinement; to release from restraint.—To be at
liberty, to be free from restraint. 50

For our purposes, we can condense this definition down to
freedom from restraint, freedom to have control over one’s own
being, and freedom to think for oneself.
Along with the abstract concepts of life and liberty, the Due
Process Clause says that no state may deprive any person of
“property,” a word that carries a more concrete meaning. Webster
defines “property” in the following manner:
1. A peculiar quality or attribute of any thing; that which is
inherent in a subject, or naturally essential to it. 2. An acquired or
artificial quality; that which is given by art or bestowed by man. 3.
Quality; disposition. 4. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying,
and disposing of a thing; ownership. 5. Possession held in ones’ own
right.—Dryden. 6. The thing owned; that to which a person has the
legal title, whether in his possession or not. 7. An estate, whether in
lands, goods, or money. 8. An estate; a farm; a plantation. . . . 51

50. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 594. The definition was remarkably
similar in Webster’s 1828 dictionary:
1. Freedom from restraint, in a general sense, and applicable to the body, or to
the will or mind. The body is at liberty, when not confined; the will or mind is at
liberty, when not checked or controlled. A man enjoys liberty, when no physical force
operates to restrain his actions or volitions. 2. Natural liberty, consists in the power
of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, except from the laws of
nature. It is a state of exemption from the control of others, and from positive laws
and the institutions of social life. This liberty is abridged by the establishment of
government. 3. Civil liberty, is the liberty of men in a state of society, or natural
liberty, so far only abridged and restrained, as is necessary and expedient for the safety
and interest of the society, state or nation. A restraint of natural liberty, not necessary
or expedient, is tyranny or oppression. Civil liberty is an exemption from the arbitrary
will of others, which exemption is secured by established laws, which restrain every
man from injuring or controlling another. Hence the restraints of law are essential to
civil liberty.
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34.
51. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 787. In 1828, according to Webster’s
dictionary, “property” meant:
1. A peculiar quality of any thing; that which is inherent in a subject, or naturally
essential to it; called by logicians an essential mode. Thus color is a property of light;
extension and figure are properties of bodies. 2. An acquired or artificial quality; that
which is given by art or bestowed by man. The poem has the properties which
constitute excellence. 3. Quality; disposition. . . . 4. The exclusive right of possessing,
enjoying and disposing of a thing; ownership. . . . 5. Possession held in one’s own
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Using this definition, we see that “property” meant one’s
possessions or belongings. As such, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states could not unlawfully divest any person of his
or her possessions or estate. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had all of these definitions available to them when they
ratified the Due Process Clause in 1868; therefore, the language
discussed so far says that no state can take away any person’s life (in
both the sense of being alive and one’s “manner of living”), freedom
(from restraint, to act under one’s own power, of speech, and of
religion), or belongings (be they land or other objects), except after
giving that person “due process of law.”
While we have examined the text of the Due Process Clause up
until “due process of law” to understand the words’ original meaning
in the 1800s, we will not be applying this same analysis to that phrase.
In 1868, The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would have been thought to embody a legal term of art because it
imitates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the federal
Bill of Rights. 52 In 1868, many state constitutions also included due
process clauses, 53 and these clauses all descended from a clause in
Magna Carta, which said,
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his
standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against

right. . . . 6. The thing owned; that to which a person has the legal title, whether in
his possession or not. It is one of the greatest blessings of civil society that the property
of citizens is well secured. 7. An estate, whether in lands, goods or money; as a man
of large property or small property.
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34.
52. The language of the amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 65–67 (2008).
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him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his
equals or by the law of the land. 54

Many state bill of rights in 1868 used Magna Carta-esque
language to forbid depriving any person of “life, liberty, or estate but
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” 55 This
formulation was thought to be identical in meaning to the federal
formulation that forbade any state from depriving any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. 56 Deprivations made
by state or federal law were presumptively constitutional. 57 The Fifth
54. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in MAGNA CARTA: LAW, LIBERTY, LEGACY
267 (Claire Breay & Julian Harrison eds., 2015).
55. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 53, at 66.
56. Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo & Katheryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787
and 1791: What Individual Rights are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2012).
57. Justice Hugo Black explains the philosophy that it is constitutional for lawmakers to
make deprivations in his dissent in the landmark 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut:
The due process argument which my Brothers HARLAN and WHITE adopt
here is based, as their opinions indicate, on the premise that this Court is vested with
power to invalidate all state laws that it considers to be arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this Court’s belief that a particular state law under
scrutiny has no “rational or justifying” purpose, or is offensive to a “sense of fairness
and justice.” If these formulas based on “natural justice,” or others which mean the
same thing, are to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or is not
constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or
unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is, of course, that of a legislative body.
Surely it has to be admitted that no provision of the Constitution specifically gives
such blanket power to courts to exercise such a supervisory veto over the wisdom and
value of legislative policies and to hold unconstitutional those laws which they believe
unwise or dangerous. I readily admit that no legislative body, state or national, should
pass laws that can justly be given any of the invidious labels invoked as constitutional
excuses to strike down state laws. But perhaps it is not too much to say that no legislative
body ever does pass laws without believing that they will accomplish a sane, rational, wise
and justifiable purpose. While I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v.
Madison, and subsequent cases, that our Court has constitutional power to strike
down statutes, state or federal, that violate commands of the Federal Constitution, I
do not believe that we are granted power by the Due Process Clause or any other
constitutional provision or provisions to measure constitutionality by our belief that
legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose,
or is offensive to our own notions of “civilized standards of conduct.” Such an appraisal
of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws, not of the
power to interpret them. The use by federal courts of such a formula or doctrine or
whatnot to veto federal or state laws simply takes away from Congress and States the
power to make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and wisdom, and
transfers that power to this Court for ultimate determination—a power which was
specifically denied to federal courts by the convention that framed the Constitution.
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause was addressed to arbitrary or
capricious executive or judicial actions and not to arbitrary and
capricious statutes, as the original Magna Carta clause was written to
protect against arbitrary and capricious actions by the king’s sheriffs,
not lawmakers. It guaranteed procedural due process, as the Supreme
Court suggested in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 58 and not substantive due process as the Supreme Court wrongly

381 U.S. 479, 511–14 (1965) (emphasis added) (footnotes and citation omitted).
58. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856). The
case hinged around whether the federal government was in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause when it tried to reclaim funds that had been embezzled from it. Id. at 275.
The Court concluded that the federal government’s actions were constitutional, id. at 285–86,
and the opinion is famous for its discussion of the meaning behind the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Justice Curtis explained the philosophy behind the phrase “due process of law,”
as first suggested in the Magna Carta, in the following excerpt from the majority opinion of
the case:
The words, “due process of law,” were undoubtedly intended to convey the
same meaning as the words, “by the law of the land,” in Magna Charta. Lord Coke,
in his commentary on those words, says they mean due process of law. The
constitutions which had been adopted by the several States before the formation of
the federal constitution, following the language of the great charter more closely,
generally contained the words, “but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of
the land.” . . .
The constitution of the United States, as adopted, contained the provision, that
“the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.” When the
fifth article of amendment containing the words now in question was made, the trial
by jury in criminal cases had thus already been provided for. By the sixth and seventh
articles of amendment, further special provisions were separately made for that mode
of trial in civil and criminal cases. To have followed, as in the state constitutions, and
in the ordinance of 1787, the words of Magna Charta, and declared that no person
shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the judgment of his peers or
the law of the land, would have been in part superfluous and inappropriate. To have
taken the clause, “law of the land,” without its immediate context, might possibly
have given rise to doubts, which would be effectually dispelled by using those words
which the great commentator on Magna Charta had declared to be the true meaning
of the phrase, “law of the land,” in that instrument, and which were undoubtedly
then received as their true meaning.
Id. at 276 (citation omitted). He later says the following:
Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of
our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of
this amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to
be due process of law, when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances
due to the government from a collector of customs, unless there exists in the
constitution some other provision which restrains congress from authorizing such
proceedings. For, though “due process of law” generally implies and includes actor,
reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some
settled course of judicial proceedings, yet, this is not universally true. There may be,
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suggested in Dred Scott v. Sandford 59 and Lochner v. New York. 60 It was
widely understood that a major objective of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause was the complete overturning and
uprooting of Dred Scott v. Sandford, ensuring that no state could take
away someone’s life, freedom, or possessions and guaranteeing, as a
legal term of art, procedural due process for all persons. 61
D. The Original Meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
Our understanding of the Equal Protection Clause may also be
informed by original dictionary meanings. This is even more the case
because whereas the Due Process Clause is a legal term of art, the
Equal Protection Clause is not and thus requires a word-by-word
analysis of its original dictionary meaning. The Equal Protection
Clause says that the states shall not “deny to any person within [their]
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 62 The word “deny” is
defined as follows:
1. To declare a statement or position not to be true. 2. To refuse
to grant; as, to deny a request. 3. Not to afford; to withhold; as, to
deny aid. 4. To disown; to refuse or neglect to acknowledge; not to
confess; as, to deny one’s master. 5. To reject; to disown; not to
receive or embrace. 6. Not to afford or yield.—To deny one’s self, is
to decline the gratification of appetites or desires; to refrain from; to
abstain.—Syn. To contradict; gainsay; disallow; disavow; disclaim;
renounce; abjure. 63

and we have seen that there are cases, under the law of England after Magna Charta,
and as it was brought to this country and acted on here, in which process, in its nature
final, issues against the body, lands, and goods of certain public debtors without any
such trial; and this brings us to the question, whether those provisions of the
constitution which relate to the judicial power are incompatible with
these proceedings?
Id. at 280 (citation omitted).
59. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
61. See discussion of Dred Scott v. Sandford and the Due Process Clause in PAUL BREST,
ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 250–51 (5th ed. 2006).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. Webster’s 1828 dictionary defines the
word in the following manner:
1. To contradict; to gainsay; to declare a statement or position not to be true.
We deny what another says, or we deny a proposition. We deny the truth of an
assertion, or the assertion itself. The sense of this verb is often expressed by no or nay.
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“Deny” clearly meant the same thing in 1848 as it does today: to
deprive of, to withhold from, or to disavow. 64 If the states were
forbidden from denying to any persons within their jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws, the double negative of “forbidden from
denying” means that they had to provide equal protection of the laws
to any persons within their jurisdiction.
But what did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment mean by
“jurisdiction”? This word is significant because the Equal Protection
Clause only applies to persons within a state’s jurisdiction. Webster
defines “jurisdiction” as
1. The legal power or authority of doing justice in cases of
complaint; the power of executing the laws and distributing justice.
2. Power of governing or legislating. 3. The power or right of
exercising authority. 4. The limit within which power may
be exercised. 65

This definition indicates that the Equal Protection Clause applies
to any person over whom a State may exercise governance: at the time
of this Clause’s creation in the 1860s, the only persons within a state
not considered “within its jurisdiction” would have been Native
Americans. 66 Immigrants are not Native Americans, so using the

2. To refuse to grant; as, we asked for bread, and the man denied us. 3. Not to afford;
to withhold. . . . 4. To disown; to refuse or neglect to acknowledge; not to confess.
5. To reject; to disown; not to receive or embrace. . . . 6. Not to afford or yield.
WEBSTER, 1828 DICTIONARY, supra note 34. We have provided readers with select 1828
definitions alongside the 1848 definitions to further support our assertion that dictionary
definitions were not rapidly changing during the period of the Framing and ratifying of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We checked the 1828 and 1867 definitions for each word defined
in this Article, and none had significantly changed.
64. From the modern-day Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, which gives the
following definition for “deny”:
1: to declare untrue <~an allegation> 2: to refuse to admit or acknowledge : disavow
<~responsibility> 3a: to give a negative answer to <~ing the petitioners> b: to refuse
to grant <~ a request> c: to restrain (oneself) from gratification of desires 4 archaic:
decline 5: to refuse to accept the existence, truth, or validity of
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 334 (11th ed. 2003).
65. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 571.
66. For an in-depth discussion of federal and state jurisdiction as applied to Native
American tribes and tribal land, see our own discussion on this topic, infra Section III.C, in
which we relied heavily upon Gerald Neuman’s excellent coverage of the issue. GERALD L.
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 171–72 (1996). Note that Donald Trump has
argued erroneously that children born to alien parents in the United States are not “subject to
the jurisdiction” of the United States and are thus not citizens. This construction was rejected
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original public meaning of the word “jurisdiction” in the 1860s,
immigrants fell “within the jurisdiction” of the state in which they
resided. As a result, the Equal Protection Clause’s language strongly
suggests that a state must provide any non-Native American person
under its governance—including immigrants and the children of
illegal aliens—with the “equal protection of the laws.”
We turn now to the core question of what the Equal Protection
Clause itself means. Webster defines the adjectival form of “equal”
as meaning:
1. Having the same magnitude or dimensions; being of the same
bulk or extent. 2. Having the same value. 3. Having the same
qualities or condition; as of equal density. 4. Having the same degree;
as of rapidity. 5. Even; uniform; not variable; as temper. 6. Being in
just proportion. 7. Impartial; neutral; not biased. 8. Indifferent; of
the same interest or concern. 9. Just; equitable; giving the same or
similar rights or advantages. 10. Being on the same terms; enjoying
the same or similar benefits. 11. Adequate; having competent power,
ability, or means.—Syn. Even; equable; uniform; adequate;
proportionate; commensurate; fair; just; equitable. 67

It is difficult to synthesize these definitions, but they suggest that
“equal” is a comparative word signifying that two or more things are
the same. When used in the Fourteenth Amendment, the word
“equal” and its connotations can be taken to mean that the protection
of the laws applies in the same fashion to any person within a
state’s jurisdiction.
The next and most critical question is: what did the word
“protection” mean in 1868? Webster defines the word
“protection” as
1. The act of protecting or preserving from evil, loss, injury, or
annoyance. 2. That which protects or preserves from injury. 3. A
writing that protects; a passport or other writing which secures from
molestation. 4. Exemption, as from molestation or arrest.—Syn.
Preservation; defense; guard; shelter; refuge; security; safety. 68

by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). It is also contrary
to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which counts as persons, for purposes of allocating
seats in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral College, all persons inhabiting a state
except for “Indians not taxed.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
67. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 363.
68. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 790.
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With these definitions in place, we see that the original public
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was to provide that no state
may, within its boundaries, “refuse to grant” to one person the same
defense, shelter, safety, security, or refuge of the law that another
person receives.
Therefore, generally, the Equal Protection Clause of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment bars all states from unlawfully taking
away the life, freedom, or belongings of any person, including both
illegal and legal aliens. All persons are owed the same defense, safety,
security, shelter, or refuge under the law as all other persons receive.
The noun in the Equal Protection Clause is “protection,” while
“equal” is merely an adjective. The Equal Protection Clause is
fundamentally about securing the protection, or shelter, of the laws.
E. Original Meaning and Public Education for Illegal Aliens
But what does all of this mean for the children of illegal aliens
seeking to attend public schools in Plyler v. Doe? We already know that
both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses apply to
children who are illegal aliens because those children fall within the
category of “any person” under Webster’s definitions of those two
words. Yet, the Due Process Clause cannot plausibly be used to defend
the right to a public-school education of children who are illegal
immigrants. The ability to attend public school is not “life, liberty, or
property”—as those terms are used by Webster—and Texas did not
violate the Due Process Clause when it passed a state statute barring
children who are illegal aliens from attending public schools. Under
the Due Process Clause’s original meaning, Texas is perfectly free to
deprive persons of life, liberty, or property so long as it does so by
judgment of their peers or by a statute, which is the law of the land.
The Texas law is unconstitutional, however, under the Equal
Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause applies to “any
person” (citizen or noncitizen, adult or child) within the jurisdiction
of a state. Illegal immigrant children who are in Texas are plainly
within the jurisdiction of the state of Texas; since the federal
government has nationalized immigration laws, only national officials
and not state officials have the power to expel the children from the
country. The 1975 Texas statute barring the children of illegal
noncitizens from attending Texas’s public school system violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it gave less protection—shelter or
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refuge under the law—to illegal alien children than it gave to other
children in the state of Texas.
The Texas law was created precisely to single out the children of
illegal immigrants and deny them the equal protection of the laws,
withholding access to the public-school system in Texas. There was no
equivalent law providing an education for the children of illegal aliens
that Texas could claim was “equal” to its general-public-schools law.
As such, there was simply no way Texas could claim it was complying
with the original public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 69
Although original public meaning analysis relies primarily, and
almost exclusively, on a textual reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the Fourteenth Amendment also shows that many Reconstruction
founders would have agreed that the Equal Protection Clause
supports the holding in Plyler v. Doe. The legislative history should be
discounted by judges as largely irrelevant to the textual analysis,
but it provides additional support for our original public
meaning textualism.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE ACT AND THE AMENDMENT:
CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ALIENAGE
A. Legislative History Behind the Fourteenth Amendment
1. Civil rights, “inhabitants,” and the origins of the equal
protection doctrine
In 1865, the Thirty-ninth Congress began a series of debates that
would eventually lead to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and then to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. These debates
were prompted by the Northern States’ reaction to both the passage
in many Southern States of laws that severely oppressed the newly

69. In arguing that it is constitutional for the children of illegal aliens to have access to
free public education, we do not mean to imply that these children are constitutionally allowed
access to all privileges of United States citizenship. For example, we would not argue here that
illegal aliens or their children should be granted access to welfare benefits. It is constitutionally
required that the children of illegal aliens be provided access to free public education because
public education is a right; as will be explained below, in 1868, thirty-six out of the thirty-seven
states in the Union recognized this right. At that time, though, there was no similar consensus
on welfare as welfare was considered a privilege. If welfare cannot be viewed as a fundamental
right, it cannot be mandatory that illegal aliens and their children be granted access to it.
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freed African American citizens and the election by Southern voters of
important ex-Confederate officials to high public offices. 70
Northerners believed that these laws, called “Black Codes,” were
meant to relegate freed African Americans to second-class social status
by forcing them to live, essentially, as slaves. 71
The North saw the Black Codes as the South’s de facto
nullification of emancipation and attempt to reverse its military loss in
the Civil War. 72 In response, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois
introduced the Civil Rights Bill on January 5, 1866, which was from
its outset a bill designed to effectively override the Black Codes. 73 The
bill was introduced by the president pro tempore as “the bill (S. No.
61) to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and
furnish the means of their vindication.” 74 When presenting the bill to
his fellow senators, Senator Trumbull explained:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled
in the insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the
freedmen, and in nearly all the States they have discriminated against
them. They deny them certain rights, subject them to severe
penalties, and still impose upon them the very restrictions which
were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of slavery,
and before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill under
consideration is to destroy all these discriminations. 75

Members of the House of Representatives had the same vision. As
described by Representative James Wilson of Iowa, who introduced
the Civil Rights Bill in the House: “It will be observed that the entire
structure of this bill rests on the discrimination relative to civil rights
and immunities made by the States on ‘account of race, color, or
previous condition of slavery.’” 76 Clearly, the Thirty-ninth Congress
recognized the Black Codes as unfair discriminatory measures and, as
such, decided to overturn them by adopting a federal Civil Rights Bill
(which eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1866). Congressmen

70. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1403.
71. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1402 (1992).
72. See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1403–04.
73. Harrison, supra note 71.
74. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 1118.
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wanted to end discrimination, promote equality, and ensure that
“[t]he states would remain free to create whatever rights they pleased,
as long as they gave them to all citizens.” 77 What is important for our
argument is not Congress’s legislative intent to establish equal rights
between black and white citizens but rather the difference, which
Congress made a point of emphasizing, between the rights the Civil
Rights Bill guaranteed to citizens and the rights it guaranteed
to aliens.
Section 1 of the bill, as it was first introduced in Congress, read:
[A]ll persons of African descent born in the United States are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States, and there shall be no
discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of
any State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color,
or previous condition of slavery[;]
....
. . . but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. 78

The use of the word “inhabitants” was clearly intentional, as
Senator Trumbull believed that “[w]ith this bill passed into a law and
efficiently executed we shall have secured freedom in fact and equality
in civil rights to all persons in the United States.” 79 Senator Trumbull
explained the list of rights that he specifically included in his draft of
the Civil Rights Bill by saying, “These I understand to be civil rights,
fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man, and which
under the Constitution as it now exists we have a right to protect every
man in.” 80 Senator Trumbull believed these rights were held by all

77.
78.
79.
80.
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Harrison, supra note 71, at 1403 (emphasis added).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (emphasis added).
Id. at 476.
Id.
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people, not just citizens. However, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, as it was finally passed over President Johnson’s veto, reads:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. 81

As one can see, from the time that the bill was drafted to the time
it was enacted into law, the focus of Section 1 of the act shifted from
inhabitants (presumably meaning any person living in the United
States, including aliens), to citizens, which of course refers to only
citizens of the United States. In the nineteenth century, aliens were
“persons” who often had some rights; however, citizens often enjoyed
other rights that were granted only to themselves. 82 The word

81. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added).
82. In his 1848 dictionary, Noah Webster defined the noun “citizen” as meaning:
1. A native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privileges of
the city in which he resides. 2. A townsman; a man of trade; not a gentleman. 3. An
inhabitant; a dweller in any city, town, or place.—4. In a general sense, a native or
permanent resident in a city or country. —5. In the United States, a person, native or
naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, and of
purchasing and holding real estate.
WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 177. Webster defined the noun “alien” as
meaning “[a] foreigner; one born in, or belonging to another country; one who is not
entitled to the privileges of a citizen.” Id. at 28. And, finally, Webster defined the noun
“denizen” as meaning:
1. In England, an alien who is made a subject by the king’s letters patent. He
can hold land by purchase or bequest, but cannot enjoy office, trusts, &c., or receive
a grant of land from the crown.—Brande. 2. A stranger admitted to residence in a
foreign country. 3. A dweller; as, the denizens of air.—Pope.
Id. at 279. It can be seen that, in America during the Reconstruction period, the word “citizen”
was commonly understood to mean something different than the words “alien” and “denizen.”
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“inhabitants” in the draft version of section 1 of the Civil Rights Bill
was changed to “citizens” in the final version of the Civil Rights Act
in order to make it clear that aliens would not be allowed to own real
property. 83 Republican Edward Cowan of Pennsylvania was one of the
strongest proponents for the change in wording:
Nobody denied that after foreigners were naturalized they could
purchase land. That is not the question. The question is whether the
General Government before naturalization can confer upon aliens
this privilege. . . . These statutes do not provide that a naturalized
citizen shall not have all the rights of every other citizen, but provide
what his rights shall be before naturalization, so that the power
which the United States originally had has nothing to do with
the question.
....
. . . Then, I say again, that by the provisions of this bill, without
naturalizing the alien, without bringing him within that uniform rule
which must be adopted before any alien can be naturalized, he is
made here able to hold lands . . . . 84

Senator Cowan’s concern regarding the use of “inhabitant” was
based solely on the notion that aliens might be able to own property,
not that they might have rights at all. Democrat Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland had the same concern and explained that he interpreted the
bill in the following manner:
That is to say, that no State shall discriminate at all between any
inhabitants within her limits on account of any race to which they
may belong, whether white or black, on account of color, if they are
not white, or on account of their having been previously in a state of
slavery, so that the white as well as the black is included in this first
section; and if this passes, and we have the authority to pass it, then
it would be impossible, as I think, for any State in the Union to draw
any distinction as between her citizens who have been there from
birth or who have been residents there for any length of time, and
he who comes into the State now for the first time as a foreigner; he

Citizens could vote and hold real estate, while denizens were “strangers admitted to residence
in a foreign country” and aliens were “not entitled to the privileges of a citizen,” such as the
right to vote.
83. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
84. Id. at 500 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
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becomes an “inhabitant.” If he comes from England or from any of
the countries of the world and settles in the State of Illinois, that
moment he becomes an inhabitant, and being an inhabitant, if this
bill is to pass in the shape in which it stands, he can buy, he can sell,
he can hold, and he can be inherited from. 85

Senator Johnson understood the bill’s basic purpose—to eliminate
discrimination—and only took issue with the fact that noncitizens
could “buy,” “sell,” “hold,” and “be inherited from.” Neither he nor
Senator Cowan raised complaints about aliens enjoying any of the
other rights listed in Senator Trumbull’s draft; they simply did not
want aliens to have rights relating to real estate ownership.
As Professor John Harrison points out, though, “[t]o say that
aliens were not citizens, and in particular that they could not hold real
estate, was not to say that aliens were to be treated as outlaws. On the
contrary, civilized countries extended to aliens the protection of the
laws.” 86 Therefore, while Congress did not believe that aliens could
own property, aliens were indeed granted equal protection of the laws
later by the Fourteenth Amendment. This change is foreshadowed by
section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which refers to the
protection under the law of inhabitants as opposed to citizens. Section
2 reads:
And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause
to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to
different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person
having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is
prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court. 87

In other words, section 2 ensures that any individual who does not
grant an inhabitant “any right secured or protected by this act,” as
outlined above in section 1, will be punished. Of course, the rights

85. Id. at 505 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
86. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1442.
87. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added).
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secured and protected by the act are only the rights guaranteed to
citizens by section 1, but the use of the word inhabitants here is in
tension with the language of section 1, which, as we explained above,
was specifically modified from its original list of rights granted to
inhabitants to a list of rights applicable only to citizens. Section 2
protects all inhabitants from the depravation of their rights in a
manner different from that of section 1—by threat of a fine or
imprisonment. This distinction between section 1 and section 2 is
clearly the beginning of the equal protection doctrine, which has come
to protect aliens, as well as citizens, from some discriminatory
state laws.
2. Constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866
In both the House and the Senate, congressmen debated whether
Congress had authority to adopt such legislation under the
Constitution and whether the bill would also convey political rights to
African American citizens. Some opponents objected that Congress
had power under the Constitution to enact laws to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery but not to legislate as to civil
rights. 88 Notwithstanding these objections, Congress eventually
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. President Andrew Johnson
vetoed the act on March 27, 1866, saying, “Hitherto every subject
embraced in the enumeration of rights contained in this bill has been
considered as exclusively belonging to the States.” 89 President
Johnson believed the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress power
to pass laws against slavery, but not laws regarding federal civil rights. 90
The Senate voted to override the President’s veto on April 4th, and
on April 9th the House followed suit, officially passing the bill as the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. 91 It was the first time in the country’s
seventy-seven-year history that a presidential veto had been
overridden as to an important piece of legislation. 92

88. See Harrison, supra note 71, at 1404.
89. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1680 (1866).
90. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1955); Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1407.
91. Bickel, supra note 90, at 29.
92. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 14, at 1408.
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Supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were afraid, however,
that President Johnson’s concern that the act exceeded Congress’s
powers might be thought valid. There was special concern that, if the
constitutionality of the act were challenged in federal court, the courts
might strike down the civil rights act as a congressional overreach not
supported by the Thirteenth Amendment. 93 This fear led the
supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to try to constitutionalize
the act. 94 Thus was born the congressional push for the
Fourteenth Amendment.
While it was still considering the Civil Rights Bill, Congress
formed a Joint Committee on Reconstruction 95 to resolve “whether
Congress had power to grant suffrage to blacks or otherwise to protect
black rights under the Thirteenth Amendment or any other existing
constitutional provision.” 96 The first attempt to write a constitutional
amendment was made by Representative John Bingham of Ohio (“the
principal drafter of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment” 97), who
proposed to the Joint Committee the language that would eventually
become Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment on January 12,
1866. 98 This first draft of the Amendment gave Congress the “power
to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every
State within this Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty
and property.” 99 A subcommittee within the Joint Committee
reworked the text and on January 20 proposed the
following language:

93. Id.
94. “The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was at a bare minimum to write the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution so that there would be no possibility of it being
held unconstitutional or of it being repealed by a later Congress.” Id.
95. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48 (1988) (comprising, with respect to the committee, “of
five Republicans—William P. Fessenden, J. W. Grimes, Ira Harris, Jacob M. Howard, and George
H. Williams—and one Democrat—Reverdy Johnson—from the Senate, and seven
Republicans—John A. Bingham, Harry T. Blow, George S. Boutwell, Roscoe Conkling, Justin
S. Morrill, Thaddeus Stevens and Elihu B. Washburne—and two Democrats—Henry Grider and
Andrew Jackson Rogers—from the House”).
96. Id.
97. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1404.
98. NELSON, supra note 95, at 49.
99. Id. (quoting BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF
FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 46 (1914)).
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Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to
secure to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same
political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal
protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. 100

As William Nelson points out, this draft was actually “clear and
unambiguous” in granting Congress the power to legislate about the
civil rights of citizens and about the political right to vote. 101 The same
language was used in yet another draft of the Amendment, upon
which the Joint Committee agreed on February 3:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to citizens of each state all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states (Art. IV, Sec. 2); and
to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of
life, liberty and property (5th Amendment). 102

Bingham brought this draft out of the Joint Committee and into
the House in mid-February 1866, while the Civil Rights Act was still
being debated as a bill.
3. Congress debates rights granted to aliens
As with the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the language
of the proposal that was to become the Fourteenth Amendment
reflected two important, contemporary beliefs regarding alienage:
first, that there was a fundamental difference between the rights of
citizens and the rights of “people,” including aliens; and second, that
despite this difference in rights, aliens still deserved the “equal
protection of the laws” to some extent. Bingham explained the need
to give aliens some, but not all, of the rights of citizens by saying:
Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States? Is it not essential to the unity of the
Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether
citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in
every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty
and property? 103

100.
101.
102.
103.
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Id. (quoting KENDRICK, supra note 99, at 51).
Id.
Id. at 50 (quoting KENDRICK, supra note 99, at 61).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866).
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In the House of Representatives, Republican Representative
Thaddeus Stevens explained the equality idea behind the Fourteenth
Amendment as follows:
The first section prohibits the States from abridging the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States, or unlawfully
depriving them of life, liberty, or property, or of denying to any
person within their jurisdiction the “equal” protection of the laws.
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not
admit that every one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted,
in some form or another, in our DECLARATION or organic law. But
the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a
limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and
allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far
that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon
all. Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the
black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree.
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford “equal” protection
to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall
be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in
court shall allow the man of color to do the same. These are great
advantages over their present codes. 104

Another Congressman, Republican Robert Hale of New York,
viewed the Equal Protection Clause in much the same way:
What is the effect of the amendment which the committee on
reconstruction propose for the sanction of this House and the States
of the Union? I submit that it is in effect a provision under which all
state legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and
procedure, affecting the individual citizen, may be overridden, may
be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress
established instead. . . .
....
. . . [R]eading the language [of the equal protection section of
the amendment] in its grammatical and legal construction it is a
grant of the fullest and most ample power to Congress to make all
laws “necessary and proper to secure all persons in the several States
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property,” with the simple
proviso that such protection shall be equal. It is not a mere provision
that when the States undertake to give protection which is unequal

104. Id. at 2459.
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Congress may equalize it; it is a grant of power in general terms—a
grant of the right to legislate for the protection of life, liberty, and
property, simply qualified with the condition that it shall be
equal legislation. 105

Members of both the House and the Senate thus agreed that the
Equal Protection Clause meant that all laws made by the states needed
to apply to all persons equally, as we argued in Part II. 106 Thus, the
intent of the legislators when drafting the amendment was the same
as the original public meaning of the amendment: “equal protection
of the laws” in 1868 meant that all laws were to protect and apply to
all persons in the same manner.
However, there was much debate in both houses of Congress
about how, exactly, aliens would benefit from this bill. As seen in the
following discourse between Republican Senator Jacob Howard of
Michigan and Senator Cowan, the main problem with granting aliens
some rights under the amendment was still the right to own real estate.
Consider this exchange in which Howard wishes to change the
wording of Section 1, and Cowan rebuts:
Mr. HOWARD. This amendment which I have offered is simply
declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every
person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to
their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen
of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born
in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the
families of embassadors [sic] or foreign ministers accredited to the
Government of the United States, but will include every other class
of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and removes
all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the
United States. . . .
....

105. Id. at 1063–64.
106. We understand that if one reads these statements without an understanding of the
textual history and original public meaning of the words of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
congressmen’s words may seem to only apply to black Americans (“man of color” in
Representative Stevens’s quote, for example). We also understand that not every congressman
during the Reconstruction period held these beliefs. However, we provide these quotes to
supplement the argument we made in Part II of this article, not supplant that analysis. The textual
analysis above makes it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was
applicable to noncitizens at the time of its framing and still today; we hope that this legislative
history provides an insight into why the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wrote the text
in such a way that it would apply to noncitizens.
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Mr. COWAN. . . . Is the child of the Chinese immigrant in
California a citizen? Is the child of a Gypsy born in Pennsylvania a
citizen? If so, what rights have they? Have they more rights than a
sojourner in the United States? If a traveler comes here from Ethiopia,
from Australia, or from Great Britain, he is entitled, to a certain
extent, to the protection of the laws. You cannot murder him with
impunity. It is murder to kill him, the same as it is to kill another man.
You cannot commit an assault and battery on him, I apprehend. He
has a right to the protection of the laws; but he is not a citizen in the
ordinary acceptation of the word.
....
So far as the courts and the administration of the laws are
concerned, I have supposed that every human being within their
jurisdiction was in one sense of the word a citizen, that is, a person
entitled to protection; but in so far as the right to hold property,
particularly the right to acquire title to real estate, was concerned,
that was a subject entirely within the control of the States. 107

Unlike Senator Howard, who seems to be particularly opposed to
aliens in this exchange and wanted to write them out of the
amendment completely, Senator Cowan recognized that aliens in the
United States deserved “protection under the laws.” His only concern
was that aliens might gain the right to own land.
Representative Bingham believed that his draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment “would give Congress power to eliminate race
discrimination throughout the country” 108 through both its Privileges
or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses. 109 However,
Representatives Roscoe Conkling and Giles Hotchkiss of New York
tried to postpone the amendment. 110 Hotchkiss, supporting
Conkling’s original motion to postpone, believed that, while
Bingham’s goal was admirable, the amendment could not be viewed

107. Id. at 2890 (emphasis added).
108. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1406.
109. “Secondly, it is likely that Bingham thought that both clauses of his proposal gave
Congress power to forbid discrimination. He regularly ran together the two constitutional
provisions from which his proposal derived, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id.
110. “When debate [over Bingham’s proposal] concluded, Roscoe Conkling of New York,
a member of the Joint Committee, moved that the amendment be postponed. In support of
Conkling’s motion, Republican Giles Hotchkiss of New York explained that Bingham’s proposal
was not properly designed to achieve its goal.” Id. at 1408.
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as “permanently securing those rights” 111 because it gave Congress
power to pass civil rights bills but “did not impose a self-executing
limitation on the states.” 112 The Reconstruction framers wanted not
only to secure Congress’s power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
but to write the act into the Constitution so that no future Southern
Democratic Congress could repeal it. Congress tried again, and this
second attempt became the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Finalizing the Fourteenth Amendment text
There were two different proposals regarding the manner in which
the Joint Committee and Congress should adopt the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, a man named R.P.L. Barber wrote a letter to
Senator John Sherman of Ohio in which he urged that Congress
simply adopt the original proposals from the Joint Committee. 113 The
other proposal came from Robert Dale Owen, Jr., a recent immigrant
and son of a well-known English radical. 114 Owen wrote a new draft of
the amendment, and the new section 1 prohibited “discrimination . . .
as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.” 115 The second section “prohibited similar
discrimination as to voting rights after 1876;” the third section
“reduced the representation of states if, prior to 1876, they denied
blacks the vote;” the fourth section “prohibited the payment of
Confederate war debts;” and the fifth and final section “granted
enforcement power to Congress.” 116
The Fourteenth Amendment ultimately followed Owen’s draft.117
His version of the amendment is important for our purposes because,
as Representative Hotchkiss recognized upon reading the proposal, its
language suggested “that any new constitutional provision be framed
as a self-executing guarantee of rights, and not merely as a grant of
power to Congress to legislate for the protection of rights.” 118 As
Representative Hotchkiss explained on February 28, 1866,

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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I understand the amendment as now proposed by its terms to
authorize Congress to establish uniform laws throughout the United
States upon the subject named, the protection of life, liberty, and
property. I am unwilling that Congress shall have any such power.
Congress already has the power to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization and uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcy.
That is as far as I am willing that Congress shall go. The object of a
Constitution is not only to confer power upon the majority, but to
restrict the power of the majority and to protect the rights of the
minority. It is not indulging in imagination to any great stretch to
suppose that we may have a Congress here who would establish such
rules in my State as I would be unwilling to be governed by. Should
the power of this Government, as the gentleman from Ohio [i.e.,
Bingham] fears, pass into the hands of the rebels, I do not want rebel
laws to govern and be uniform throughout this Union. 119

Representative Hotchkiss was specifically concerned that the
Southern Democrats would regain control of Congress and repeal the
civil rights laws the Reconstruction Congress had worked so hard to
pass. According to Hotchkiss, “The object of a Constitution is not
only to confer power upon the majority, but to restrict the power of
the majority and to protect the rights of the minority.” 120 Owen’s draft
of the amendment was the only draft that would actually enshrine the
rights of equality and liberty in the Constitution, where the political
vacillations and vicissitudes of Congress could not touch them.
Owen’s proposal was also important because “its first section explicitly
guaranteed blacks equality of civil rights, and after 1876, its second
section conferred equality of voting rights as well.” 121 There was no
mention of immigrants or noncitizens but, as explained above, the
draft did prohibit “discrimination . . . as to the civil rights of persons
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” 122 and
noncitizens (as we argue in Part II) are indeed “persons” who deserve
the equal recognition of their civil rights.
Owen’s proposal was changed and made slightly more ambiguous,
though, when the Joint Committee, “on the motion of Bingham and
with only two Democrats in opposition, agreed to tack on an

119. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (emphasis added).
120. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1871).
121. Nelson, supra note 95, at 55.
122. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting KENDRICK, supra note 99, at 83).
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additional section . . . onto the Owen proposal.” 123 This new section,
spearheaded by Bingham, was mostly in line with what Owen had
already proposed:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. 124

This language would eventually become the main text for Section 1 of
the ratified Fourteenth Amendment. The reason for this change is not
immediately clear, but Professor William Nelson speculates that this
section “might . . . have been designed to protect against nonracial
discriminations, as, for example, discriminations on religious or
political grounds.” 125 Or perhaps “Bingham meant not merely to
secure an equality of rights, as Owen did, but to protect some rights
absolutely.” 126 His true motivation remains unclear, though, and the
“additional section may merely have been redundant,” so the Joint
Committee removed this section from the “proposed Fourteenth
Amendment by a 7–5 vote.” 127
How, then, did Bingham’s words, crucial to the security of the
equal protection and due process of all persons, not just citizens, get
incorporated into what is now the Fourteenth Amendment?
As the draft was debated in both houses of Congress and by the
Joint Committee, Owen’s proposal was modified to remove sections
2 and 3, which “guarantee[d] voting rights to blacks after 1876 and
reduc[ed] the representation of states which denied blacks the vote
prior to that date.” 128 Congress created new versions of sections 2 and
3, which “reduc[ed] the representation of states that did not allow
blacks to vote” (section 2) and that “barr[ed] many white Southerners
from the franchise” (section 3). 129 These changes were probably
enacted to address the issue of black suffrage without explicitly
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granting former slaves the right to vote, as Owen’s original sections 2
and 3 had done.
With Owen’s draft overhauled to such an extent, Bingham saw the
opportunity to supplant the narrow interpretation of civil rights—
Owen’s draft prohibited “discrimination . . . as to the civil rights of
persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,”130
as discussed above—with his own broader text, which he had tried to
add once before:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. 131

This time, Representative Bingham’s “motion was adopted by a
10-3 vote, with a combination of radical and moderate Republicans in
opposition and a similar combination of Republicans, together with
three Democrats, in support,” 132 thereby making Bingham’s equal
protection language the new Section 1 of the amendment. The
diversity of support and opposition for this new version of the
amendment indicates just how divided Congress was over the issue.
Those Republicans who voted against the Owen-Bingham hybrid
probably wanted a greater push for black suffrage, while the few
Democrats who supported the amendment perhaps recognized the
necessity of a universal declaration of the protection of certain rights
for all people.
Between the first Owen draft and the final Owen-Bingham
“omnibus measure”, 133 the most important (for our argument) change
was the substitution of Bingham’s equal protection language for
Owen’s more specific civil rights phrasing. This change “took place
behind closed doors,” 134 so it is unclear why the passages were
switched; however, Nelson speculates that “the committee decided to
introduce the concept of due process into section one in order to
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guarantee that, in regard to fundamental personal rights, state law
would be procedurally fair as well as substantively equal.” 135
If this is true, our argument gains credence; the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment might have added Bingham’s text because
they wanted to secure fairness in court as well as equality under the
law for all persons. The new section 1 also included a “provision
reducing the representation of states that denied the right to vote to
males over the age of twenty-one.” 136 This move can be seen “either
as a remedy for state violations of voting rights protected by section
one or as an authorization for the denial of voting rights to blacks.”137
The contradiction is somewhat confusing, but exemplifies just how
divided the Thirty-ninth Congress was on the issue of black suffrage.
Further changes to the omnibus measure included a “new section
three,” which “deprived all persons who had voluntarily supported the
Confederate cause of the right to vote in federal elections prior to
1870” and section 4, which “guaranteed payment of the Union war
debt, prohibited payment of the Confederate debt, and barred the
payment of compensation to former slaveowners for their loss of
their slaves.” 138 Changes also included separating out section 5 from
section 1. 139
5. Ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment
The new, combined Owen-Bingham amendment “was approved
by the Joint Committee on April 28 and reported on April 30 to both
the Senate and the House.” 140 The amendment received mixed
reactions. For example, Connecticut Senator James Dixon worried
about Southern opposition to the bill and argued:
The amendment proposed is right enough, if the reconstruction
committee can get any southern State to accept it. But unless they
do so, it is of course only a shot in the air, which may be right and
true, but will hit nowhere—unless indeed it falls upon the heads of
the gunners. Is it not far wiser for Congress to make sure of what it
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has done; to cry “Enough for this time;” to be content that it has
secured the supremacy of law and justice in all our territory; and to
admit at once to their seats all Representatives and Senators who can
take the prescribed oaths? 141

Representative Thaddeus Stevens, a member of the Joint
Committee and a congressman very committed to the amendment’s
cause, had a different take:
The first section prohibits the states from abridging the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States, or unlawfully
depriving them of life, liberty, or property, or of denying to any
person within their jurisdiction the “equal” protection of the laws.
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not
admit that every one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted,
in some form or other, in our DECLARATION or organic law. But the
Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a
limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and
allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far
that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon
all. . . . Now different degrees of punishment are inflicted . . . I need
not enumerate these partial and oppressive laws. Unless the
Constitution should restrain them those States will all, I fear, keep
up this discrimination, and crush to death the hated freedmen. . . .
And yet certain of our distinguished friends propose to admit State
after State before this [amendment] becomes a part of the
Constitution. What madness! Is their judgment misled by their
kindness; or are they unconsciously drifting into the haven of power
at the other end of the avenue? I do not suspect it, but others will. 142

Despite the criticism, “the omnibus amendment passed the House
as proposed, but it faced difficulties in the Senate.” 143 It stalled in the
Senate until June 8, when it passed with two more significant changes.
Section 1 was expanded to contain “a definition of citizenship,” and
Section 3 was considerably weakened—instead of disfranchising all
those who had supported the Confederacy, it merely barred from
federal office those Confederate supporters who prior to the Civil War
had taken an oath to support the Constitution.” 144 The House agreed
141.
142.
143.
144.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2332 (1866).
Id. at 2459 (first emphasis added).
See Nelson, supra note 95, at 58.
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to all of these changes on June 13, and the amendment was finally
sent off to the states for ratification. 145
On June 25, 1866, Connecticut became the first state to ratify the
amendment, and by the end of that year, five more states had ratified
it. 146 Eleven states ratified the amendment in January 1867, and by
June of that year, twenty-two states had ratified it. 147 Finally, by July
1868, the final six states necessary for passage of the amendment had
ratified, and despite New Jersey and Ohio’s attempted withdrawals of
their ratifications, Secretary of State William Henry Seward declared
the Fourteenth Amendment ratified as part of the United States
Constitution on July 28, 1868. 148
145. Id.
146. Id. at 59.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 59–60. There has been debate about whether the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified legally due to Congress’s requirement that the Confederate states ratify the amendment
in order to regain representation in Congress. Bruce Ackerman, of Yale Law School, believes
that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in violation of the ratification process laid out in
Article V. Ackerman argues:
The facts are these: once the Thirty-ninth “Congress” made its proposal, the
Fourteenth Amendment was sent to all existing governments of the South as well as
the North. When one Southern government, Tennessee, ratified the amendment, the
Republicans immediately admitted its representatives to Congress. But the other ten
Southern states rapidly rejected the Congressional initiative—often justifying their
decision by asserting that they had been unconstitutionally excluded from deliberating
and voting on its proposal. Since there were never more than thirty-seven states in the
Union during this period, a blocking veto of ten had been assembled. Worse yet, there
were important pockets of opposition in the North as well. The Fourteenth
Amendment seemed doomed.
Until Congress intervened with a series of Reconstruction Acts in the spring and
summer of 1867. These revolutionary statutes divided the ten Southern states into
five military districts and placed the Union Army in control of any further transition
to statehood. . . . After revolutionizing the South’s political class, the acts instructed
the Army to supervise the election of delegates to constitutional conventions who
would then offer their proposals for approval by the (redefined) People of each state
before they were finally submitted to Congress. . . .
. . . Congress was not content to determine whether the new constitutions were
truly “republican” before allowing Southern representatives to take their seats on
Capitol Hill. Instead, it left them out in the cold until “said State, by a vote of its
legislature elected under said constitution, shall have adopted the amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, proposed by the thirty-ninth Congress, and known
as article fourteen.” Indeed, even ratification would not suffice. The state would
remain unrepresented until “said article shall have become a part of the Constitution
of the United States.” Only then would the bar be raised and military rule be lifted.
These last two Congressional provisions—enacted over presidential veto—are
qualitatively different from all that came before. Up to now, it was possible to drape
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The Fourteenth Amendment was written to address more issues
than just those regarding equality—it was “an omnibus proposal that
dealt simultaneously with four of the leading problems of
Reconstruction: the status of the Civil Rights Bill, apportionment of
representatives, suffrage, and eligibility of former rebels for state and
federal office.” 149 What has made the amendment famous, though, is
its second sentence in Section 1, which is derived from both the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and Bingham’s first attempt at drafting the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the amendment in its final
form reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

a legal fig leaf over each Congressional action. But at this point, we are in the presence
of naked violations of Article Five. These last two Congressional conditions cannot
conceivably be justified by the Guaranty Clause, however expansively interpreted—
for the simple reason that Congress had, by this point, already approved the sates’
constitutions as republican. Nevertheless it was still asserting its power to keep the
states out in the cold until they went along with its demand to ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment.
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 110–11 (1998)
(emphasis added).
However, other scholars disagree with Ackerman’s claims. John Harrison of the University of
Virginia Law School responds to and rebuts Ackerman’s arguments in an article published in the
University of Chicago Law Review. John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction
Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001). He says:
Finally, the southern ratifications may have been effective, despite legal defects in the
ratifying governments, because those governments had de facto authority and hence
were able to bind their states. The legal authority of de facto governments is a familiar
principle of international law that has been followed in American constitutional
practice, and the Article endorses it in this context. Either the political question [of
whether the identification of a state’s lawful government is a political question to be
decided by the political branches of the national government and ultimately by
Congress] or the de facto government thesis must confront the argument that
southern ratifications were invalid because extorted through unlawful federal threats.
The Article maintains that it is doubtful whether the ratifications were so extorted,
and claims that in any event Article V of the Constitution does not implicitly invalidate
ratifications made in the face of illegal threats.
Id. at 375. We agree with Harrison’s scholarship and believe, for the purposes of this article, that
the Fourteenth Amendment was passed pursuant to the Article V amendment process.
149. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1408. The Fourteenth Amendment increased slave states’
representation in the House and Electoral College after repealing the three-fifths clause of U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 150

As seen in the excerpts discussed above, Section 1 distinguishes
between the entitlements of citizens and the entitlements of persons,
including aliens. States cannot abridge the privileges or immunities of
United States citizens, but they also cannot deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process and cannot deny any person,
including noncitizen aliens, the equal protection of the laws. As of
1866, aliens were granted due process of the law as well as the more
vague and novel right to “equal protection of the laws.” Inhabitants
of the United States who are not citizens may not have the political
rights of American citizens, but they have had some rights,
constitutionally, since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
B. What, Exactly, Does “Within Its Jurisdiction” Mean?
Before going further, we must address the meaning of the phrase
“within its jurisdiction” in Section 1’s Equal Protection Clause.
Current legal scholarship and historical evidence suggests that this
phrase requires that a state provide fire and police services to any
person within its borders regardless of citizenship status. First, taking
the “literal meaning” approach used in Part II, let us define
“protection.” Webster gives the following meaning:
1. The act of protecting or preserving from evil, loss, injury, or
annoyance. 2. That which protects or preserves from injury. 3. A
writing that protects; a passport or other writing which secures from
molestation. 4. Exemption, as from molestation or arrest.—Syn.
Preservation; defense; guard; shelter; refuge; security; safety. 151

Looking at this definition as well as synonyms, the word
“protection,” in the Equal Protection Clause, could refer narrowly to
the provision of some sort of police or fire service as well as protection
under the criminal and civil law. “The act of protecting or preserving
from evil, loss, injury, or annoyance” can be construed as police and
fire services because both crimes and destruction-via-fire can be

150. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
151. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 790.
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considered “evil, loss, injury, or annoyance.” 152 The synonyms
“defense,” “guard,” “security,” and “safety” 153 can also all be applied
to police or fire services—police personnel and firemen act as
defenders and guards on a state’s behalf. Therefore, based on our
originalist argument, it seems that the idea of “protection,” in the
expanded sense of “guarding” or “security” and police or fire services,
can be applied to the Fourteenth Amendment; “equal protection of
the laws” could be construed as “equal safety” or “equal access to fire
and police services” within this reading. However, our aim in this
Article is to address access to public education as a constitutional right,
not access to fire and police services as a constitutional right.
As Professor John Harrison argues, when Congress was in the
process of debating the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, the entire justification
behind the act came from the Fourteenth Amendment. 154 This Act
“was the third of the four major Reconstruction civil rights laws,” and
it “was directed at private violence against freed slaves and Republicans
and at state officials who failed to deal with such violence.” 155 Professor
Harrison explains that “[t]he claim that Congress had power to act
directly against private outrages like those of the Klan usually rested
not on the theory that the Equal Protection Clause forbade
discrimination in general, but on a belief that it specifically forbade
discrimination in law enforcement—the protection of the laws.”156
This concept of equal protection of the laws as applied to
nondiscrimination in law enforcement is seen in the text of the 1871
Ku Klux Klan Act itself, which reads:
Be it enacted . . . [t]hat any person who, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction
of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall,
any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured
in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or
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circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same
rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in
like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the [Civil Right Act
of 1866]; and the other remedial laws of the United States which are
in their nature applicable in such cases. 157

With this act, congressional Republicans “focused on the states’
duty to protect life, liberty, and property” 158 and attempted to provide
freed slaves and Republicans in the South with ways to seek justice for
the discrimination and violence they faced. However, in order to
protect these racial and political minorities, the Ku Klux Klan Act also
granted the president (at the time, Ulysses S. Grant) the ability to
suspend habeas corpus in any state that did not follow the new rules set
out in other sections of the act:
That whenever in any State or part of a State the unlawful
combinations named in the preceding section of this act shall be
organized and armed, and so numerous and powerful as to be able,
by violence, to either overthrow or set at defiance the constituted
authorities of such State, and of the United States within such State,
or when the constituted authorities are in complicity with, or shall
connive at the unlawful purposes of, such powerful and armed
combinations; and whenever, by reason of either or all of the causes
aforesaid, the conviction of such offenders and the preservation of
the public safety shall become in such district impracticable, in every
such case such combinations shall be deemed a rebellion against the
government of the United States and during the continuance of such
rebellion, and within the limits of the district which shall be so under
the sway thereof, such limits to be prescribed by proclamation, it
shall be lawful for the President of the United States, when in his
judgment the public safety shall require it, to suspend the privileges
of the writ of habeas corpus, to the end that such rebellion may be
overthrown: Provided, That all the provisions of the second section
of [the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863], which relate to the
discharge of prisoners other than prisoners of war, and to the penalty
for refusing to obey the order of the court, shall be in full force so
far as the same are applicable to the provisions of this
section: Provided further, That the President shall first have made
proclamation, as now provided by law, commanding such insurgents

157. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012)).
158. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1437.
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to disperse: And provided also, That the provisions of this section
shall not be in force after the end of the next regular session
of Congress. 159

However, it was not this controversial section that would
eventually cause the Supreme Court to overturn the Ku Klux Klan Act
in the 1883 case United States v. Harris. 160 Instead, the Court struck
down the act due to the Equal Protection Clause.
On August 14, 1876, Sherriff R.G. Harris and nineteen other men
formed a lynch mob and stormed a Tennessee jail, killing one of the
prisoners. 161 Under section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, two or more
persons were forbidden from conspiring together
for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person
or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State from
giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal
protection of the laws, or shall conspire together for the purpose of
in any manner impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the
due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to
any citizen of the United States the due and equal protection of the
laws, or to injury any person in his person or his property for lawfully
enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal
protection of the laws. 162

Therefore, at the time of Harris’s crime, he and his conspirators
violated section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, and the federal
government levied criminal charges against Harris and his conspirators
under the act. 163 Unfortunately, and quite incorrectly, the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Harris, striking down the Act and its attempt
to provide all persons within the United States with the equal
protection of the laws. 164

159. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (first emphasis added).
160. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
161. Id. at 629–31.
162. Klu Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (2012)).
163. Harris, 106 U.S. at 630.
164. Id. at 644.
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Justice Woods, delivering the opinion of the Court, 165 held that
the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to actions taken by the
states, not by individuals. 166 He based his reasoning on Chief Justice
Waite’s opinion in United States v. Cruikshank:
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; but
this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It
simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by
the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen
as a member of society. . . .
....
. . . [In addition, t]he fourteenth amendment prohibits a State
from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more than
the one which precedes it, and which we have just considered, add
anything to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution
against another. The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of
republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to
protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its
power. That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still
remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is
to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment
guarantees, but no more. The power of the national government is
limited to the enforcement of this guaranty. 167

In his own words, Justice Woods then continued to explain,
“[T]he legislation under consideration finds no warrant for its
enactment in the Fourteenth Amendment” because Harris and his
men were acting as individuals. 168 Woods asserted:
When the State has been guilty of no violation of its provisions; when
it has not made or enforced any law abridging the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; when no one of its
departments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or denied to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; when, on the contrary,

165.
166.
167.
168.
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Justice Harlan dissented, but did not write a dissenting opinion.
Harris, 106 U.S. at 637–40.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1875).
Harris, 106 U.S. at 639.
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the laws of the State, as enacted by its legislative, and construed by
its judicial, and administered by its executive departments, recognize
and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no
duty and confers no power upon Congress. 169

Unfortunately, because the state of Tennessee, as a single entity,
had not taken action against the members of the prison—Harris and
his men stormed it as individual agents—Justice Woods and his
majority deemed the violent actions unpunishable under the
Fourteenth Amendment. And, because the Ku Klux Klan Act
attempted to apply Fourteenth Amendment language and philosophy
to actions taken by individuals as well as actions taken by states, Justice
Woods struck down the act as a whole.
Justice Woods’s entire argument in Harris was grounded in the
fact that the Fourteenth Amendment can only apply to actions taken
by the states, not individuals, and so the Ku Klux Klan Act was
unconstitutional because it attempted to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment to actions taken by individuals. He began his discussion
of the Fourteenth Amendment by saying, “It is perfectly clear from
the language of the first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment] that
its purpose also was to place a restraint upon the action of the
states.” 170 He cited the Slaughterhouse Cases 171 as well as United States
v. Cruikshank as previous Supreme Court cases that also upheld the
Fourteenth Amendment as applying specifically to the states, and he
ended this section of the majority opinion by proclaiming,
As, therefore, the section of the [the Ku Klux Klan Act] under
consideration is directed exclusively against the action of private
persons, without reference to the laws of the states or their
administration by the officers of the state, we are clear in the opinion
that it is not warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution. 172

Justice Woods’s suggestion that the Ku Klux Klan Act was
unconstitutional because it applied its Fourteenth Amendment
language only to individual actors and not states or “officers of the
state” is germane to our argument in this Article: if the Fourteenth
Amendment can only apply to the states, as Woods suggests, the

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id. at 638.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
Harris, 106 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added).
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appellants had every right to take Texas to court in Plyler v. Doe. The
issue in Plyler was an action taken by a state against a group of minority
individuals; using Justice Woods’s own insistence that the Fourteenth
Amendment can be applied solely to actions taken by states, reliance
on the Fourteenth Amendment was appropriate in Plyler because
Texas was taking action against noncitizen children residing within
its jurisdiction.
Critics of Plyler v. Doe might point out that the noncitizens tried
in Plyler were within Texas’s jurisdiction illegally, and as such the
Equal Protection Clause should not apply to them. As discussed
below, there are two arguments that together refute this line of
thinking. First, the phrase “within its jurisdiction” was intended to
emphasize that states were not responsible for members of Native
American tribes living in the state. Second, at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, there were no formal
immigration or naturalization laws.
C. “Within Its Jurisdiction” and Native American Sovereignty
Professor Gerald L. Neuman explains the complex relationship
between Congress and Native Americans during the 1860s:
The legislative history and the received judicial construction of
the citizenship clause confirm that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did deny constitutionally mandated citizenship to a few
categories of children, whom they regarded as not “subject to the
jurisdiction” of the United States. These were the common law
exceptions for aliens closely associated with a foreign government,
and an American addition—native Americans living under tribal
quasi-sovereignty. 173

Native Americans who lived in tribal societies were “governed by
their own legal systems” and were “under the protection of their
tribes, not of the state or federal government.” 174 Many Native
American tribes had both “legal and military independence . . . from
state or federal governance” 175 and, as such, the phrase “within its
jurisdiction” was included in the Fourteenth Amendment to
underscore the fact that states were not responsible for providing
173. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
171 (1996) (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 172.
175. Id.

AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW
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equal protection under or due process of the law to the Native
American tribes living within their borders. Native American tribes
functioned as their own self-governed communities within the United
States, and the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not wish to
change that.
The text of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
recognizes that Native American tribes are populations that live within
the United States but are not administrated by the United States
government. Section 2, which deals with apportionment of
congressional representatives and the consequences of denying votes
to voting-age males, starts with the phrase “[r]epresentatives shall be
apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed.” 176
At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, Native
Americans might have lived within a state’s borders, but if they were
not counted in Congressional apportionment, they clearly had no part
in America’s political process. To the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Native Americans were their own sovereign nations with
their own systems of government that lived on U.S. soil. As such,
Native Americans were inhabitants of the state in which they lived, but
they were not “within the jurisdiction” of that state.
The status of Native Americans was hotly contested throughout
the debates of the various Reconstruction Congresses, and as early as
1862, it was clear that Native Americans (referred to as “Indians”)
were separate entities. Representative Bingham said during a debate
about naturalization:
Who are natural-born citizens but those born within the Republic?
Those born within the Republic, whether black or white, are citizens
by birth—natural-born citizens. There is no such word as white in
your Constitution. Citizenship, therefore, does not depend upon
complexion any more than it depends upon the rights of election or
of office. . . . Gentlemen can find no exception to this statement
touching natural-born citizens except what is said in the
Constitution in relation to Indians. The reason why that exception
was made in the Constitution is apparent to everybody. The several
Indian tribes were recognized at the organization of this
Government as independent sovereignties. They were treated with
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
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as such; and they have been dealt with by the government ever since
as separate sovereignties. Therefore, they were excluded from the
general rule. 177

The sovereignty of Native American tribes was especially
important during the creation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Members of Congress recognized that, because of their sovereignty,
Native Americans neither paid taxes nor were counted among
the population for apportionment purposes. As Senator
Trumbull explained:
The Constitution of the United State excludes them from the
enumeration of the population of the United States, when it says
that Indians not taxed are to be excluded. It has occurred to me that
perhaps an amendment would meet the views of all gentlemen,
which used these constitutional words, and said that all persons born
in the United States, excluding Indians not taxed, and not subject to
any foreign Power, shall be deemed citizens of the United States. 178

Likewise, as Senator Doolittle explained:
Indians not taxed were excluded because they were not regarded as
a portion of the population of the United States. They are subject to
the tribes to which they belong, and those tribes are always spoken
of in the Constitution as if they were independent nations, to some
extent, existing in our midst but not constituting a part of our
population, and with whom we make treaties. 179

This notion of interacting with Native American tribes through
treaty-making also set the Native Americans apart from aliens, citizens,
or other “persons” falling under the “within its jurisdiction” clause.
This idea can be seen in the following debate between Senators
Sumner and Johnson about whether the United States controlled the
actions of Native American tribes:
Mr. SUMNER. Allow me to ask the Senator whether we do not
always deal with the Indians through the treaty-making power?
Mr. JOHNSON. We have done so, but not necessarily.
Mr. SUMNER. Is it not the habit?

177. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639 (1862).
178. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 527 (1866).
179. Id. at 571.
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Mr. JOHNSON. Certainly it is; but I am dealing with it now as
a question of power. We have dealt with them as a treaty-making
power, but it is not because there ever was a doubt that Congress
could deal with them by legislation; and, in point of fact, although
we have dealt with them as a treaty-making power, we have done so
by making them make the treaty. It is no treaty-making power in the
ordinary acceptation of the term; that is to say, the parties are
not equal. 180

The United States made treaties with Native American tribes but did not
control their affairs or have power over their people. In this way, Native
Americans had sovereignty but no right to vote. Congress recognized this
and had no plans to change Native Americans’ voting status:
Mr. KASSON. . . .
....
Now, sir, in the history of this country we have excluded certain
classes generally from taking part in the election. We have excluded
the Chinese, we have excluded all pagans, we have excluded Indians
as a general rule, we have excluded white males under twenty-one
years of age, we have excluded women of all ages irrespective of
intelligence or tax paying. 181

Throughout the Reconstruction debates there was no question
that Native American tribes were their own entities, and the
congressmen involved in drafting and ratifying both the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments did not wish Native Americans to reap
the benefits that the Amendments provided. The phrase “within its
jurisdiction” was almost certainly included in the Amendment because
Native Americans fell completely outside of both state and
federal jurisdictions.
D. Immigration During the Reconstruction Period: No Federal Laws,
“Legal,” or “Illegal”
Even though the phrase “within its jurisdiction” was written into
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to demonstrate the
sovereignty of Native American tribes, it still means that any person
that a state might have governmental control over is owed both equal
protection and due process of the laws. As such, critics of this Article’s
180. Id. at 506.
181. Id. at 237.
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dissection of Plyler v. Doe might argue that the alien children were
indeed within Texas’s jurisdiction but were there illegally, so the Equal
Protection Clause could not apply to them. We think that argument
carries little weight because at the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was written, there was no distinction between “illegal” and “legal”
aliens because there were no federal immigration laws. 182
Professor Neuman argues that “considerable regulation of
immigration existed at the state level; most of it enjoyed a degree of
federal endorsement; and some of it was backed by federal
sanctions.” 183 However, Professor Neuman does note that “the earliest
use of the term [illegal alien] that LEXIS or WESTLAW turns up in a
judicial opinion occurs in Waisbord v. United States, which is itself not
a masterpiece of decorum. The term undocumented alien is
even newer.” 184
That the earliest recorded federal use of the term “illegal alien” is
from 1950 does not bar the possibility that there existed some
publically understood concept of aliens who had come to the United
States in an illicit fashion. And it is true that certain states may have
had strict immigration policies to protect their borders and regulate
the flow of foreigners. As Neuman explains,
[S]tate immigration law in the century preceding 1875 included five
major categories: regulation of the migration of convicts; regulation
of persons likely to become or actually becoming a public charge;
prevention of the spread of contagious diseases, including maritime
quarantine and suspension of communication by land; regionally

182. As will be discussed shortly, Congress had passed “immigration law” in the form of
the Naturalization Act of 1798, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Alien Act, all passed during John
Adams’s tenure. However, the first act was repealed in 1802, the second applied only during
wartime, and the third expired in 1800. Additionally, a new Naturalization Act was passed in
1802, but that was repealed in 1828. The next Naturalization Act would be passed in 1870. As
such, there was no federal immigration law on the books at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framing and ratification. See NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 40–41.
183. Id. at 176.
184. Id. at 270 n.61 (citation omitted) (citing Waisbord v. United States, 183 F.2d 34 (5th
Cir. 1950)). Neuman also says,
Illegal alien does appear as a defined term in both 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b) and 29 C.F.R.
§ 500.20(n), but the two definitions are context driven and inconsistent. The former
specifies a category of aliens who were unlawfully in the United States at the
time they committed a felony, and the latter reduces to aliens without
employment authorization.
Id. at 270 n.62.
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varying policies relating to slavery, including the prohibition of the
slave trade; and bans on the migration of free blacks, including the
seamen’s acts. 185

At the federal level, though, there was virtually no restriction on
immigration. “Federal statutes backed up the state quarantine laws
and state laws barring the importation of slaves or free black aliens,”186
but, aside from those specialized statutes, there was no real federal
immigration policy in place during 1866.
Frank L. Auerbach describes this lack of federal immigration policy
in his book Immigration Laws of the United States:
Of the four basic courses a sovereign country can follow in
formulating its immigration policy—unrestricted immigration,
qualitative restriction, quantitative restriction, and prohibition of all
immigration—the United States, ever since 1921, has chosen the
second and third course by imposing both qualitative and
quantitative restrictions on aliens seeking to enter the United States
as immigrants. This period was preceded by some forty-five years of
only qualitative restrictions and this period, in turn, by more than one
hundred years of immigration unrestricted by federal legislation. 187

Congress passed the Page Act of 1875 as a “[q]ualitative
restriction of immigration” 188 and did not act again on immigration
until the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, 189 Moreover, for “more than
one hundred years” prior to 1875, federal immigration was essentially
unrestricted, back to the time of the signing of the Declaration of
Independence, the American Revolution, the founding of our
country, and the framing of our Constitution. Indeed, it was not until
ten years after the Constitution’s ratification that Congress passed
“the first federal legislation dealing with” immigration. 190

185. Id. at 41–42.
186. Id. at 42.
187. FRANK L. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES: A TEXTBOOK
INTEGRATING STATUTE, REGULATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND LEADING
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS, WITH A COMPREHENSIVE INDEX, CITATION GUIDE AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 (1955) (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 3.
189. Emergency Quota Act of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952).
190. AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 2 (referencing the Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat.
570 (expired 1800)).
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While anti-immigrant sentiments were certainly present during the
period in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, ratified, and
enacted, there were no federal anti-immigration laws passed at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and ratification. Antiimmigrant sentiment was not officially codified into American law
until 1875 with qualitative restrictions on immigration and
strengthened in 1921 with quantitative restrictions on immigration.191
Both the Page Act of 1875 192 and the Emergency Quota Act of 1921193
were passed well after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification
in 1868.
In 1798, during President John Adams’s tenure, Congress passed
three acts attempting to restrict immigration into the United States:
the Naturalization Act of 1798, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Alien
Act. 194 The Naturalization Act 195 increased the time necessary for
immigrants to become naturalized citizens from five to fourteen years
and was repealed in 1802; 196 the Alien Enemies Act, 197 which applied
only during wartime, gave the president authority to apprehend and
deport aliens if the United States was at war with their home
countries; 198 and the Alien Act 199 allowed the president to arrest and
deport any alien he thought dangerous, but “it expired by its own
terms in 1800, never to be renewed.” 200 Congress passed another
Naturalization Act in 1802 201 that sought “to make registration at the
time of arrival a documentary prerequisite to later naturalization,” but
it was widely disregarded and was repealed in 1828. 202
Due to the expiry of the three Acts passed in 1798 and the repeal
of the 1802 Naturalization Act, “there was no federal legislation
restricting the admission to, or permitting the deportation of aliens in,

191. Id. at 3, 7.
192. Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974).
193. Emergency Quota Act of 1921.
194. NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 40.
195. Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802).
196. NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 41.
197. Alien Enemies Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§
21–24 (2012)). The Alien Enemies Act is still in effect today. NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 41.
198. NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 41.
199. Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800).
200. NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 40–41.
201. Naturalization Act of 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 153.
202. NEUMAN, supra note 173, at 41.
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the United States” 203 until 1875. “Beginning in 1830,” though, “a
marked anti-alien feeling developed in the United States primarily
directed against the preponderantly Catholic immigration from
Ireland.” 204 Reacting to this sentiment, Congress considered bills
“which proposed some of the measures which later on became part of
American immigration law, principally the exclusion of certain
undesirable classes . . . and the requirement of certificates to be issued
immigrants by American consuls abroad.” 205 However, none of these
bills were passed. 206
Instead, states took matters into their own hands because they
“had to carry the expense of caring for the sick, destitute, or otherwise
dependent immigrants.” 207 Laws such as those passed in New York,
California, Louisiana, and Massachusetts, where there were large
influxes of immigrants, “provided, for example, for a tax on each
immigrant, for inspection of immigrants by State officials, and for
bonds in the case of aliens considered unable to be self-supporting.” 208
These state laws were not passed to restrict the flow of immigration or
to keep immigrants out of their states (even if there was anti-Irish
sentiment at the time); they were passed for financial purposes.
However, in 1875 the Supreme Court held, in both Henderson v.
Mayor of New York209 and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 210 that “the power to
legislate concerning the immigration and deportation of aliens rested
exclusively with the Congress of the United States.” 211
Aside from the lapsed statutes, the only federal action taken on
immigration in the United States prior to 1875 (prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and ratification) was the
Burlingame Treaty executed between China and the United States in
1868. 212 Remarkably, this treaty was not an expression of the antiChinese xenophobia apparent in the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
92 U.S. 259 (1875).
92 U.S. 275 (1875).
AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 3.
See id. at 5.
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and 1904. 213 Rather, its language paralleled the language from the
Fourteenth Amendment itself, ratified on the same day the
Burlingame Treaty was proclaimed: “This [treaty] recognized the
inherent right of man to change his home and allegiance and
guaranteed to Chinese subjects such ‘privileges, immunities, and
exemptions in respect to travel and residence’ in the United States as
might be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most
favored nations.” 214
This treaty shows an acceptance (on the part of the federal
government, not necessarily U.S. residents or state legislatures) of
certain immigrants living on U.S. soil. It went so far as to grant
Chinese subjects certain “‘privileges, immunities, and exemptions in
respect to travel and residence’. . . as might be enjoyed by the citizens
or subjects of the most favored nations” 215! Not only did the
Burlingame Treaty use language mirroring the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the treaty was proclaimed on the same day as the
Fourteenth Amendment’s official ratification. Given how scrutinized,
debated, and edited the Fourteenth Amendment’s language was
during its framing, 216 the similarities between language in the
Burlingame Treaty and the newly-ratified Fourteenth Amendment
must have been intentional. While the Fourteenth Amendment would
not—and could not—ever apply its Privileges and Immunities Clause
to aliens living on American soil, for a time, Chinese aliens were
welcomed with “privileges and immunities” to the United States by
our federal government. At least through the year 1868, when the

213. Id. at 6. The Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, was written to combat “[t]he
tremendous influx of Chinese immigrants to the West.” Id. at 5. It “provided for suspension of
immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States for a period of ten years.” Id. at 6. This
Act “also barred Chinese from naturalization” and “ordered deported” Chinese immigrants
“illegally in the United States,” though it did allow “the entry of Chinese teachers, students,
merchants or those ‘proceeding to the United States . . . from curiosity.’” Id. at 6 (internal
citation omitted). The Act was “extended from time to time, last on April 27, 1904.” Id. at 6.
The final extension became the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1904. Id. This 1904 Act “extended
[the 1882 Act] without time limit” and “remained in effect until December 17, 1943, when all
Chinese exclusion laws were repealed and Chinese persons were made eligible for immigration
and naturalization.” Id.
214. Id. at 5 (quoting Treaty of Burlingame, China-U.S., art. VI, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat.
739, 740).
215. Id.
216. See supra Section III.A.

284

225

An Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe

Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, there was no concept of “illegal”
alienage in federal or state statues. 217
The discriminatory educational policies at issue in Plyler v. Doe may
have been driven by anti-immigrant prejudice, as xenophobia in the
United States grew strongly in the years following 1868 218 and still
lingers in our nation’s collective consciousness. However, the laws that
established a canon of federal immigration policy—the Act of March
3, 1875; 219 the contract labor laws of 1885 and 1887; 220 the Act of
March 3, 1903; 221 the Act of February 20, 1907; 222 the Immigration

217. Before
1868,
the
Supreme
Court
declared
state
immigration
statutes unconstitutional.
218. Cf. supra note 187 (briefly explaining the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and 1904,
which established the deportation of “illegal” Chinese immigrants); infra notes 227–230
(summarizing the evolution of immigration law in the United States from 1875 to 1924,
showing that, as the immigrant population in the United States increased, so too grew
Americans’ xenophobia).
219. The Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, grew out of “[t]he lack of any control
over the movement of immigrants into the United States as a result of the Supreme Court
decisions and the increasing volume of immigration.” AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 3. This
Act was the first of many to have “excluded from admission” certain types of immigrants—in
this original Act, the excluded classes of immigrants were “criminals and prostitutes.” Id. This
Act also “entrusted the inspection of immigrants to collectors of the ports.” Id. The Act “first
established the policy of federal restriction on immigration,” while later acts, such as the Act of
August 3, 1882, and the Act of March 3, 1891, expanded the list of “classes of inadmissible
aliens.” Id. at 3–4.
220. In 1885 and 1887, Congress “passed the so-called contract labor laws which made it
unlawful to import aliens into the United States under contract for the performance of labor or
services of any kind.” Id. at 3. These laws—the Act of February 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332,
and the Act of February 23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414—were created “[i]n response to the
complaints of labor organizations that certain employers were lowering the standards of
American labor by importing cheap foreign labor.” AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 3. As one
may recognize from following current American politics, this “cheap foreign labor” antiimmigrant argument is still being made 130 years later.
221. The Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, “introduced significant new
features into American immigration law,” adding on to the list of “inadmissible” aliens not only
undesirables such as “epileptics, persons who had been insane within five years prior to
application for admission, persons who had had two or more attacks of insanity, and professional
beggars” along with, for the first time, immigrants with certain political beliefs. AUERBACH,
supra note 187, at 4. Specifically, the Act of 1903 “made inadmissible ‘anarchists, or persons
who believe in, or advocate, the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United
States, or of all government, or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public officials,’”
thereby delineating certain “proscribed opinions” that the United States did not want migrating
onto its soil. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214).
222. The Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, was created “[a]s a result of a
further increase of immigration and in response to Presidential messages to Congress.”
AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 4. The Act “increased the head tax [of 50 cents on each passenger
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Act of February 5, 1917; 223 and the Quota Law of 1921 224—were
passed after the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, they cannot be used to ascertain the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because no federal
immigration law existed at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
framing and ratification, the alien children in Plyler v. Doe could indeed
be considered within Texas’s jurisdiction and the Federal Equal
Protection Clause rightfully applied to them.

brought to the United States] to $4.00 and added to the excludable classes” a hefty amount of
maladies, such as “imbeciles, feeble minded persons . . . persons afflicted with tuberculosis . . .
and women coming to the United States for immoral purposes.” Id. The February 20, 1907,
Act “also created a Joint Commission on Immigration consisting of three members of the Senate,
three members of the House of Representatives, and three other persons, to make an
investigation of the immigration system of the United States.” Id. This new Joint Commission
“completed its investigation by 1911 and published its report in forty-two volumes,” which
became “the basis for the comprehensive Immigration Act of February 5, 1917.” Id. at 4–5.
223. The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, was “passed as a
result of the growing demand for more effective restrictions on immigration.”AUERBACH, supra
note 187, at 6. It greatly expanded the list of “inadmissible classes of aliens” and “codified all
previously enacted exclusion provisions,” adding a “controversial provision . . . excluding aliens
over sixteen years of age who were unable to read.” Id. This literacy-specific provision was the
result of twenty years of buildup as “[a] bill providing for a literacy test for immigrants was first
passed by Congress in 1897 but was vetoed by President Cleveland and similar bills were
subsequently vetoed by Presidents Taft and Wilson.” Id. However, the 1917 Act passed despite
President Wilson’s veto, and it “placed the literacy requirement on the statute book” while also
adding “further restrictions on the immigration of Asian persons by creating the so-called barred
zone, natives of which were declared inadmissible to the United States.” Id. Finally, this Act
“broadened considerably the classes of aliens deportable from the United States and introduced
the requirement of deportation without statute of limitation in certain more serious cases.” Id.
Xenophobia was clearly on the rise and growing ever stronger.
224. The Quota Law of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, “represented a drastic change in American
immigration policy” as it “limited the number of aliens of any nationality entering the United
States to 3 per cent of foreign born persons of that nationality who lived in the United States in
1910.” AUERBACH, supra note 187, at 7. The Quota Law was enacted because of “new demands
for restriction on immigration” stemming from “[t]he unsettled conditions in Europe after the
first World War” which drove many European immigrants to the United States. Id. The Quota
Law “represented a drastic change” in the American approach to immigration policy because
“[u]p to its enactment, laws restricting immigration were all qualitative in character, in other
words, they provided that certain classes of aliens were inadmissible into the United States.” Id.
Under this new law, federal immigration policy not only barred immigrants from entry based on
these certain classes, it also created “quantitative restrictions by putting a ceiling on the total
number of aliens whose admission as immigrants was permitted into the United States during
any one year.” Id. This quota-based immigration restriction would become the new basis for
American immigration policy in years to come.
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E. Aliens: Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Since Its Inception
Since the Fourteenth Amendment may apply to any type of
noncitizen inhabitant living in the United States, we must examine its
original purpose as relating to those persons living in the United States
in 1866. As explained above, the Fourteenth Amendment was written
to tackle more than just equality—it was “an omnibus proposal that
dealt simultaneously with four of the leading problems of
Reconstruction: the status of the Civil Rights Act, apportionment of
representatives, suffrage, and eligibility of former rebels for state and
federal office.” 225 What made the amendment famous, though, is its
second sentence, derived from both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
Bingham’s first draft of the amendment, which neatly distinguishes
between the rights of citizens and the rights of persons. Section 1 of
the amendment once again reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 226

As discussed above, the Fourteenth Amendment distinguishes
between citizens and persons, including aliens. States cannot abridge
the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens, but they also cannot
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law and cannot deny any person the equal protection of the laws. As of
1868, aliens were granted due process under the law as well as the
vaguer concept of “equal protection of the laws.” Some political rights
are reserved exclusively for citizens, but aliens have been entitled to
some constitutional rights since the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified.
Unfortunately, rights were not necessarily granted to every person
in America after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was

225. Harrison, supra note 71, at 1408. The Fourteenth Amendment increased slave states’
representation in the House and Electoral College after amending the Three-Fifths Clause of
the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2.
226. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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especially evident in California, where, starting in the early 1850s, a
large wave of Chinese immigrants came to work in the gold mines,
settled there, and formed their own communities. 227 Californians were
at first hospitable towards the aliens, but by 1852 they came to resent
their new neighbors; the Chinese were an insular community, and it
seemed to the Californians that many of them did not wish to be
naturalized. 228 To force the Chinese out, the California legislature
levied unfair taxes against the aliens (fees related to work in the mines)
and enforced them through violence. 229 The Chinese found support
from Christian missionaries willing to help the otherwise ostracized
community and sought legal recourse by hiring lawyers. But they
often faced difficulty in courts because, in California, the Chinese were
not allowed to testify. 230
The California Supreme Court held in favor of the Chinese in
four major cases related to the discriminatory taxation, 231 but

227. Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century
America: The First Phase, 1850–1870, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 529, 534–35 (1984).
228. See id. at 536.
229. Id. at 539, 539 n.52.
230. Id. at 541 n.58, 548–49.
231. In People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169 (1857), the California Supreme Court struck down
California’s 1855 “Capitation Tax.” McClain, supra note 227, at 545. The tax had “imposed on
the master or owner of each vessel landing passengers incompetent by the laws of the United
States or the laws and constitution of this State to become citizens thereof a tax of $50 for each
such passenger.” Id. at 544 (internal citations omitted). In Downer, “it took the justices [of the
California Supreme Court] less than half a page of the reports to void the measure as an
impermissible interference with the national government’s power over foreign commerce.” Id.
at 545.
In Ex parte Ah Pong, 19 Cal. 106 (1861), the California Supreme Court held that “[t]he mere
fact that [petitioner] was Chinese and living in the mining district . . . did not subject him to the
foreign miners’ tax.” McClain, supra note 227, at 558. According to the court,
If the act [creating the Foreign Miners’ License Tax] is to be construed as imposing
this tax, it cannot be supported, any more than could a law . . . which imposed upon
every man residing in a given section of the State a license as a merchant, whatever
his occupation.
Ah Pong, 19 Cal. at 108.
In Ah Hee v. Crippen, 19 Cal. 491 (1861), “[a] Chinese miner brought a replevin action to
recover a horse that had been attached by the county tax collector to enforce payment of the
tax.” McClain, supra note 227, at 558. Importantly, the plaintiff “claimed, in short, equal
protection of the laws” because he based his argument on the fact that the Foreign Miners’
License Tax “conflicted with article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, which granted
foreigners who were bona fide residents the same rights of possession and enjoyment of property
as United States citizens.” Id. The California Supreme Court “chose to decide the case on the
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discrimination and racism towards the Chinese was still rampant.
Finally, in 1867, China sent Anson Burlingame, “an American
minister to the Manchu Court in Peking,” to reevaluate the 1858
Treaty of Tientsin, the last treaty between the United States and
China. 232 An amendment to the Treaty of Tientsin was signed in
Washington in July of 1868, which stated that “Chinese subjects
visiting or residing in the United States, shall enjoy the same
privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or
residence, as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the
most favored nation.” 233 Despite the treaty, California still levied
miners’ taxes against the Chinese. When the House Ways and Means
Committee (along with Senators Benjamin Wade and Roscoe
Conkling) visited San Francisco in June 1869 and noted California’s
anti-alien discrimination, Congress realized that the states were
not following the Fourteenth Amendment and that a change
was necessary. 234
In 1870, Republican Senator William Stewart of Nevada
submitted a resolution for the Committee on the Judiciary to
inquire if any States are denying to any class of persons within their
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, in violation of treaty
obligations with foreign nations and of section one of the
amendment to the Constitution; and if so, what
fourteenth
legislation is necessary to enforce such treaty obligations and
such amendment . . . . 235

basis of statutory construction” instead of the equal protection argument, but it still ruled in
favor of plaintiff. Id. at 559.
In Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534 (1862), the California Supreme Court addressed the issue
of “the respective power of the state and federal governments in foreign trade and commerce
regulation.” McClain, supra note 227, at 555. The plaintiff was taxed in San Francisco for two
months under the Chinese Police Tax. Id. The California Supreme Court used “Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in the Supreme Court Case, Brown v. Maryland [25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419
(1827)]” to hold that “[b]y singling out one group of foreigners residing in the state for
taxation, the California Legislature was discouraging immigration from that land and was thus
discriminating against foreign commerce.” Id. at 556. In other words, “the court concluded that
the tax on the Chinese was a tax analogous to a tax that discriminated against imports.” Id.
232. Id. at 561.
233. Id. at 563 (quoting The Burlingame Treaty, China-U.S., art. VI, July 28, 1868, 16
Stat. 739, 740).
234. Id. at 564–65.
235. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1870).
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The Committee reported on California’s mistreatment of the
Chinese aliens, which it considered a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, leading Stewart to propose what would become the Civil
Rights Act of 1870: “a bill . . . to secure to all persons the equal
protection of the laws.” 236 The importance of this Act cannot be
overstated, especially for our thesis, because it was spurred by the
mistreatment of aliens, not citizens, and its purpose was to ensure that
the Fourteenth Amendment was applied properly to all persons.
The first proposed text of what would become the 1870 Act read
as follows:
Be it enacted, &:c., That all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States, Indians not taxed excepted, shall have the same right
in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom to the contrary notwithstanding. No tax or charge shall be
imposed or enforced by any State upon any person emigrating
thereto from a foreign country which is not equally imposed and
enforced upon every person emigrating to such State from any other
foreign country, and any law of any State in conflict with this
provision is hereby declared null and void.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom shall
subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this
act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of
such person being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is
prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year,
or both, in the discretion of the court.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the
means of their vindication, passed April 9, 1886, is hereby reenacted,

236. Id. at 323.
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and said act, except the first and second sections thereof, is hereby
referred to and made a part of this act. 237

The text is very similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, with three
major differences. The first is the use of the phrase “all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States”—as we have already explained,
there was a clear difference between the original public meaning of
the words “persons,” “inhabitants,” and “citizens.” The 1866 Act’s
original draft used inhabitants, as shown above, and the final Act gives
only citizens the rights listed in section 1. The Fourteenth
Amendment uses “citizens” in one instance and “persons” in another
to emphasize that there are rights granted to U.S. citizens not afforded
to aliens. The use of “persons” here is intentional and is a clear
indicator that this bill was drafted to protect aliens.
The second difference is the inclusion at the end of section 1 of
the sentence:
No tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any
person emigrating thereto from a foreign country which is not
equally imposed and enforced upon every person emigrating to such
State from any other foreign country, and any law of any State in
conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and void. 238

This phrase is likely aimed at California, which, as previously
discussed, was unfairly taxing its Chinese alien inhabitants. It applies
to all states, though, and can, in a way, be read as a modified equal
protection clause. It says that a state may not impose a tax on a certain
group of aliens unless all aliens in the state are taxed equally. It is not
quite the same as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause because it only necessitates equality among aliens, not among
all persons; however, the wording and the concept of equal taxation
for all aliens implies that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
logic applies to the situation.
The final, most important difference between the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1870 is the new phrase “[t]hat all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, Indians not taxed
excepted, shall have the same right . . . to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is

237. Id. at 1536.
238. Id. (statement of Sen. Stewart).
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enjoyed by white citizens.” 239 Webster defines “benefit” as “1. An act
of kindness; a favor conferred. 2. That which is useful or beneficial; a
word of extensive use, and expressing whatever contributes to
promote prosperity and happiness. . . SYN. Advantage; profit; service;
use; avail.” 240 Therefore, the 1870 Act’s full-and-equal-benefit-of-thelaws concept goes further than just the “equal protection of the laws”
laid out in the Fourteenth Amendment: the Civil Rights Act of 1870
grants to all persons both equal protection and the “full and equal
use of the laws.” Under the 1870 Act, the laws applied to all
persons equally.
Unsurprisingly, there was debate in Congress about whether the
law would grant aliens the right to own real estate:
Mr. POMEROY. I have not examined this bill, and I desire to ask
the Senator from Nevada a question. I understood him to say that
this bill gave the same civil rights to all persons in the United States
which are enjoyed by citizens of the United States. Is that it?
Mr. STEWART. No; it gives all the protection of the laws. If the
Senator will examine this bill in connection with the original civil
rights bill, he will see that it has no reference to inheriting or holding
real estate.
Mr. POMEROY. That is what I was coming to.
Mr. STEWART. The civil rights bill had several other things
applying to citizens of the United States. This simply extends to
foreigners, not citizens, the protection of our laws where the State
laws deny them the equal civil rights enumerated in the first section.
Mr. POMEROY. They have the same civil rights in that regard.
Does the property of a foreigner dying here descend under our laws?
Most of the States appoint a public administrator who administers
upon the estates of foreigners differently from what he does on the
estates of citizens. Does this interfere with that?
Mr. STEWART. I think not.
Mr. POMEROY. Foreigners are not allowed to petition the
Senate. If the bill passes, will the petitions of foreigners be
received here?
Mr. STEWART. . . .

239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 115.
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It has nothing to do with property or descent. We left that part
of the law out; but it gives protection to life and property here. The
civil rights bill, then, will give the United States courts jurisdiction
to enforce it.
Mr. POMEROY. I am undoubtedly in favor of the object of the
bill. I wanted to see how far the Senator was willing to go. So far as
the bill goes I think it is right; I only question the propriety of not
going further myself. 241

As Senator Stewart explains to Republican Samuel Pomeroy of
Kansas, the point of the bill was to ensure that all states were following
the Fourteenth Amendment and, specifically, applying it to the aliens
in their jurisdictions. He did not want to elevate aliens to the status of
citizens or to grant them any more rights than they had under the
Fourteenth Amendment; he simply wanted to ensure they were
receiving the equal protection that had already been granted to them.
In the House, Republican Aaron Sargent viewed the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1870 in the same manner. He explained during the
House’s debate on the bill, “I believe, and I have contended for years
in my own State, that by natural equity, by common justice, the
Chinaman and any one else, no matter what his color, is entitled to
the equal protection of our laws in life, liberty, and security.” 242 But,
Representative Sargent continued, “I never have believed that we
should go beyond that and make them all citizens.” 243
This opinion—that aliens deserved some basic rights and fair
treatment, but were not to be considered citizens—was held not only
by members of Congress, but also the public. For example, in 1868 in
California, there was widespread editorial opposition to the
abridgement of rights and unfair taxes levied directed at the
Chinese. 244 When the California State Senate voted to repeal a bill
barring Chinese aliens from testifying in U.S. courts in criminal cases,
the Daily Alta California “expressed the hope that a bill to permit

241.
242.
243.
244.

CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870).
Id. at 4275.
Id.
See McClain, supra note 227, at 560–61.
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testimony in civil cases would soon follow.” 245 Even earlier, in 1857,
when the ban on Chinese testimony was upheld—after the state

245. Id. at 561 (citing Editorial Notes, DAILY ALTA CAL., Jan. 24, 1868, at 2). Editorials
written in support of aliens were not just penned in California. Americans across the country
supported noncitizens. For example, during the Civil War, a bill was proposed to grant
naturalization to aliens who fought in the conflict, and this was met with support from citizens.
Dwight Foster, Attorney General of Massachusetts, wrote in October 1864:
Gentleman: In reply to your inquiry as to the law of Congress in regard to the
naturalization of aliens who have been honorably discharged from the service of the
United States, the following is the only act of Congress on the subject known to
me, viz:—
“Sec. 21. And it be further enacted, That any alien of the age of twenty-one years
and upwards who has enlisted or shall enlist in the armies of the United States, either
the regular or the volunteer forces, and has been or shall be hereafter honorably
discharged, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, upon his
petition, without any previous declaration of his intentions to become a citizen of the
United States, and that he shall not be required to prove more than one year’s
residence within the United States previous to his application to become such citizen;
and that the Court admitting such alien shall, in addition to each proof of residence
and good moral character as is now provided by law, be satisfied by competent proof
of such person having been honorably discharged from the service of the United
States as aforesaid.”—[Acts of xxxvii Congress, Sess. II., Chap 200.
By its terms you will see that regular naturalization continues to be
indispensable, but an honorably discharged alien soldier is entitled to be naturalized
upon proof of one year’s residence in the United States previous to the petition
for naturalization.
Dwight Foster, Naturalization of Aliens, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 14, 1864, at 2.
Citizens of the United States agreed with this law and recognized that the noncitizens fighting
in a conflict as domestic as the Civil War deserved to become naturalized and gain the rights
granted to American citizens. Support can also be seen in the Wisconsin State Register. For the
benefit of its alien population and to express its endorsement of the law, the newspaper reported
Congress’s consideration of the law under the heading “Important to Aliens,” saying:
A bill to permit aliens who have served one year in the army to become citizens
of the United States, being under consideration in the Senate, an amendment was
offered that no aliens who had resided in the United States five years previous to the
19th April, 1861, should be naturalized under the laws of the United States after April
1st, 1865. This is manifestly just and proper, and we hope to see it become a law.
Important to Aliens, WIS. ST. REG., Jan. 14, 1865, at 2 (emphasis added).
Turning our focus back to California, an editorial written after the Civil War in 1866 addressed
the distinction between an alien’s political and personal rights in the state of California. The
Daily Evening Bulletin of San Francisco delivered a sentiment that many Americans echoed at
the time of Fourteenth Amendment ratification: that aliens should be granted the “personal
rights” of citizens so long as “political rights,” such as running for office or voting, are reserved
for citizens of the United States. The editorial is framed within the question of rights granted to
black citizens, but addresses the rights of aliens:
We had occasion lately, in referring to a recent decision of one of the Courts of
the State of Nevada, by which a negro was excluded from sitting on a Jury, to discuss
the distinction between personal and political rights, and to remark that the Civil
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legislature defeated a bill that would have reversed the decision of
People v. Hall 246—the Daily Evening Bulletin said, “We regret this
action, based as it is entirely upon prejudice, and can only express our
conviction that the period will ultimately arrive when it will be clear
to all that the law as it stands is mischievous and prejudicial in the
highest degree to the public interests.” 247 Certain members of the

Rights bill, which had recently become a law, was intended to secure, and on its face
purported to secure, only the personal rights of freedmen, such as the right of
locomotion, of property, of marriage, and the like, but did not extend to or pretend
to confer or regulate political rights, such as the right of suffrage and its kindred rights.
The Supreme Court of this State has just made a decision upon a subject wholly
germane to that discussion, and which is based upon the same distinction. By Article
1, section 17 of the Constitution of California, it is provided that “Foreigners who
are, or may hereafter become bona fide residents of this State, shall enjoy the same
rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment and inheritance of property, as native
born citizens.” Here certain personal rights are expressly guaranteed to aliens. But as
to political rights, such as the right to hold office, the Supreme Court, in the recent
case of Walther vs. Rabholt, hold that aliens have no such political rights. Judge
Sawyer, delivering the opinion of the Court in that case, says:
[“]It may be said, generally, that the right to vote and of eligibility to office are
political and correlative rights. At common law an alien had no recognized political
rights. He was permitted to enjoy certain civil rights, but even these were hedged in
by many restrictions and limitations. * * * Neither a denizen at common law nor a
naturalized citizen under the statutory law of England can hold office. A juritori an
alien cannot. And such we understand to be the common law in other states where
not in any respect modified by constitutional or statutory provisions. And such we
also understand the law to be with reference to political rights in all civilized countries.
We know of no constitutional or statuary modification of the common law in this
State as to the political rights of aliens.[”]
This is so strongly and clearly expressed as to preclude any further confusion
regarding the distinction between personal and political rights; and it will be generally
conceded that a negro may be protected in his life and property without necessarily
becoming a voter, as it has already come to be admitted that one may assist in the
abolition of slavery, and yet not thereby bind himself to marry his daughter to a negro.
Personal and Political Rights of Aliens, DAILY EVENING BULL., Aug. 1, 1866, at 2 (internal
citations omitted).
246. 4 Cal. 399 (1854). In brief: George W. Hall and two other men were convicted by
the grand jury of Nevada County for the murder of one Ling Sing. Three Chinese and one
Caucasian witness testified on the state’s behalf; however, Hall’s counsel appealed on the ground
that the Chinese testimony was not valid. The Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court,
Hugh C. Murray, reversed the guilty ruling, holding that Chinese testimony had been
improperly received because of a California criminal statute which said that “[n]o black or
Mulatto person, or Indian, shall be permitted to give evidence in favor of, or against, any white
person.” Id. at 399.
247. Admissibility of Chinese and Negro Testimony, DAILY EVENING BULL., Apr. 10,
1857, at 2.
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Californian public seemed to realize, more so than congressmen or
state legislators, that the Chinese aliens deserved to be treated fairly.
After 1870, the equal-protection-means-equal-benefits line of
thinking and the concept of basic rights for aliens became standard
practice. Evidence of this trend can be seen in the cases discussed in
Part III and can also be found in congressional records from the late
1800s. For example, when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
Republican Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana offered up his
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
[T]he question arises upon this clause of the fourteenth amendment
as to what the power of Congress is in regard to the substantial rights
and equality of people in the States. The conclusion of this section
reads thus:
“Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
I desire to inquire what is meant by “the equal protection of the
laws” which a State shall not deprive any person of? To what does
the word “protection” refer? Does it mean that the State shall not
deprive a man of the equal protection of the law for his person? Will
any one contend that it shall have a construction so narrow as that?
Will it be contended that it means that a State shall not deprive a
person of the equal protection of the law for his property; that it shall
be confined to that? I submit that when it declares that no State shall
deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws, it means
substantially that no person shall be deprived by a State of the equal
benefit of the laws; that the word “protection,” as there used, means
not simply the protection of the person from violence, the protection
of his property from destruction, but it is substantially in the sense
of the equal benefit of the law; that it is intended to promote equality
in the States, and it refers to the laws of the States. 248

Aliens are not made citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment,
nor are they granted the “privileges or immunities” that citizens
receive. However, the second clause of section 1 does apply to them,
giving them equal protection of the laws, as Senator Morton explained
above. In the late 1860s, Congress realized that various taxes and
other measures were being levied specifically against aliens across the
United States (and especially in California), and newspapers began to

248. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 846–47 (1872).
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speak out against the discriminatory measures. Congress recognized
that the states were not following the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment and instead were applying the laws unequally to their
inhabitants; Congress also recognized that there was popular support
for a more fair treatment of aliens. As such, the Civil Rights Act of
1870 was written specifically to protect aliens from taxes and other
measures that Congress thought in 1870 violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Finally, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
and then the 1870 Act, the idea of basic civil rights for aliens was a
constitutional concept.
F. Public Education: A Right, Not a Privilege
1. Public education in Texas in 1869
Critics might counter that a public education is not necessarily a
right or that it does not fall under the broad categories of due process
and equal protection. However, while the Federal Constitution is
silent on the issue of education, many state constitutions during the
Reconstruction period did indeed have education clauses. In fact, in
1868, the constitutions of twenty-eight out of the thirty-seven states
in the Union had “mandatory language which made the establishment
of free public schools open to all students obligatory.” 249 The states
that provided this access to public education were Alabama,250
Arkansas, 251 California, 252 Delaware, 253 Florida, 254 Georgia,255

249. Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of
Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 451.
250. ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. XI, § 6, reprinted in 1 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 95 (William F. Swindler ed., 1973) [hereinafter SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS].
251. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in ARK. CODE ANN. CONSTITUTIONS
663 (2004).
252. CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. IX, § 3, reprinted in 1 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 456.
253. DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. VII, § 11, reprinted in 1 DEL. CODE ANN. 302 (2007).
254. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, §§ 1–2, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 250, at 361–62.
255. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1, reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 509.
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Indiana, 256
Kansas, 257
Louisiana, 258
Maine, 259
Maryland,260
Massachusetts, 261 Michigan, 262 Minnesota, 263 Mississippi, 264 Missouri,265
Nevada, 266 New York, 267 North Carolina, 268 Ohio, 269 Oregon,270

256. IND. CONST. of 1851, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 3 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 250, at 387.
257. KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. VI, §§ 2–3, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 250, at 90.
258. LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art. 135, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 250, at 158.
259. ME. CONST. of 1819, art. VIII, reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 323.
260. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (enacted in 1867), reprinted in 4 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 472.
261. MASS. CONST. ch. V, § 2 (enacted in 1780), reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 106.
262. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 4, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 250, at 234.
263. MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 250, at 311.
264. MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 250, at 385.
265. MO. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 531.
266. NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 2, reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 275.
267. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. IX, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra note
250, at 205.
268. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 427.
269. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. VI, § 2, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 566.
270. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (enacted in 1857), reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 215.
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Pennsylvania, 271 Rhode Island, 272 South Carolina, 273 Texas,274
Vermont, 275 West Virginia, 276 and Wisconsin. 277
Most importantly for our argument as to Plyler v. Doe, the Texas
state constitution in effect in 1869, right after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, did include a provision about education.
Article IX of the 1869 Texas Constitution discusses all details
regarding education, and section 1 of article IX establishes public
schools throughout the state, saying: “It shall be the duty of the
Legislature of this State, to make suitable provisions for the support
and maintenance of a system of Public Free Schools, for the gratuitous
instruction of all the inhabitants of this State, between the ages of six
and eighteen years.” 278 Texas could have chosen to say “for the
gratuitous instruction of all the citizens of Texas,” but it instead used
the phrase “all of the inhabitants of this State,” which, as we have
shown, was understood to include both citizens and aliens at the time.
Granted, by 1876, the constitution did stipulate that schools must be
segregated, saying, “Separate schools shall be provided for the white
and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for
both,” 279 but nowhere does article IX address aliens.
Thus, one year after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which gave equal protection and due process of the laws
to aliens, Texas guaranteed a free public school education to both
citizens and aliens, as indicated by the phrase “gratuitous instruction
of all the inhabitants of this State” in article IX, section 1 of its
constitution. “Gratuitous” here means “free,” not “unnecessary,” as

271. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. VII, § 1, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 302.
272. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. XII, § 1, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 395.
273. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 3, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 302
(Franklin B. Hough ed., 1872).
274. TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 4, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS, supra
note 250, at 310 (ratified in 1869).
275. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 41 (enacted in 1793), reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 514.
276. W. VA. CONST. of 1861, art. X, § 2, reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS,
supra note 250, at 358.
277. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (enacted in 1848), reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 250, at 392.
278. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added).
279. TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. VII, § 7.
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we understand the word to mean today. Webster defines it as “1. Free;
voluntary; not required by justice; granted without claim or merit. . . .
2. Asserted or taken without proof . . . .”280 Similarly, “gratuity” at the
time was defined as “1. A free gift; a present; a donation; that which
is given without a compensation or equivalent. 2. Something given in
return for a favor; an acknowledgement.” 281
At the time, Texas may not have been aware that it was allowing
the free education of aliens, or there may not have been as large an
alien community as there is today; however, by using the word
“inhabitants” instead of “citizens,” it included aliens in its public
education system whether it wanted to or not. This fact makes it
difficult for anyone who knows the history detailed above to accept
the law under review in Plyler. Why, in 1975, did the Texas legislature
find it necessary to change something that had been a part of its
constitution for one hundred years?282 Was the influx of illegal aliens
280. WEBSTER, 1848 DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 517.
281. Id.
282. Once enacted, Financing of Public School Education, ch. 334, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws
896 (amending TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1972)) read:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens
and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day
of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available
School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally
admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years
on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be
permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in
which his parent, guardian, or person having lawful control of him resides at the time
he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit
into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either
citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not
over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent,
guardian, or person having lawful control resides within the school district.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1975).
The specific changes that the 1975 amendment brought on were: In subsection (a), the phrase
“who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are” was substituted
for “without regard to color” and the ages “five” and “21” were substituted for the ages “six”
and “18.”
In subsection (b), the phrase “who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien
and who is” was inserted, the age “five” was substituted for the age “six,” and the phrase
“notwithstanding the fact that he may have been enumerated in the scholastic census of a
different district or may have attended school elsewhere for a part of the year” was deleted. In
subsection (c), the phrase “who are either citizens of the United states or legally admitted aliens
who are” was inserted and the age “five” was substituted for the age “six.”
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and their children so great that, suddenly, after one hundred years of
allowing alien children a free public education, the strain was too
much on the school system? The Reconstruction era was not a
particularly flattering one for the South, race-wise; why, in 1868, were
aliens included in public schooling but in 1975, a purportedly more
accepting time, alien children became a concern?
2. Plyler v. Doe oral argument
These questions were addressed, albeit in a roundabout manner,
during oral argument for Plyler. Richard L. Arnett, arguing on behalf
of Texas, claimed the statute was justified because the influx of
nonresident children put a significant burden on the state’s public
school system:
When one considers the fact that Mexico’s population is doubling
approximately every twenty years, and that approximately four and a
half million children of school age are out of school in Mexico right
now because of [a] lack of adequate facilities, it doesn’t take a great
deal of imagination to understand the Texas legislature’s concerns
for the future. 283

He continued, “The purpose of this statute is to protect the
Mexican American population’s education in Texas,” explaining that
“a district on the border [between Texas and Mexico], Eagle Pass,
which has a ninety-five percent Mexican American population,
decided to enact a policy precluding illegal aliens from admission into
their schools.” 284
According to Mr. Arnett, the districts of Eagle Pass, Brownsville,
and other “Valley districts” supported section 21.031 because “they
have also suffered a seven-hundred-percent increase in the last year in

It can be clearly seen from these changes that the 1975 amendment was focused on targeting
the children of illegal aliens: before the 1975 changes, no mention at all was made of citizenship
or alienage. One wonders why the change was brought upon so suddenly in 1975—perhaps
there was a large influx of illegal aliens? There may have also been monetary motivations,
considering that the public schools’ no-cost nature is emphasized, and it is highly probably that
many illegal aliens were not paying taxes that helped to keep the public schools “free of tuition.”
The current version, TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.001 (West 2011), makes no mention
of aliens.
283. Oral Argument at 1:20, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (No. 80-1538),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1538.
284. Id. at 5:39.
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illegal alien enrollment.” 285 He also contended, “The one interest that
Texas asserts here which we have predictably met with opposition on
as to whether that is permissible is that as a subsidiary to protecting
our resources, we would like to reduce the incentive for illegal
immigration, particularly of families and of school-aged children.” 286
The Justices seemed to fault this logic, though, cornering Mr.
Arnett with statements such as “there can’t be any question, can there,
that an alien, documented or undocumented, brought before a
criminal court is entitled to the same due process as any other person
in the United States?” 287 And
does that mean that you assume . . . that these [noncitizen, “illegal
alien”] children will remain in the school district because it is just
too much of an administrative burden to get them deported, so they
are going to be part of the community anyway, and you would rather
have them uneducated than educated? 288

The Justices did not consider the “strain on Texas resources”
argument to be a satisfactory justification for Texas’s discrimination
against the children of noncitizens.
The other advocate for the appellants, John C. Hardy, argued that
Texas was correct in denying noncitizen children the right to a public
education because of their status as nonresidents of Texas. His
argument—if the noncitizen children “do not have legal resident
status or domiciliary status legally . . . they cannot attain the resident
status . . . allowing them to attend school free of charge”—hinged on
“the classification in the [Texas] statute.” 289 “It is not alienage or
citizenship,” he claimed. “It is between a legal resident and a nonlegal resident, or a residency statute and a non-residency statute.” 290
Hardy then tried to explain that the Texas law “provides that nonresident citizens and non-resident aliens are both required to pay
tuition.” 291 He made the equivalence that, because “the Court has
continuously held . . . that in higher education branches . . . a non-

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
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Id. at 6:30.
Id. at 13:12.
Id. at 4:50.
Id. at 16:00.
Id. at 24:11.
Id. at 24:35.
Id. at 24:47.
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resident of the state can be charged a different tuition than a resident
of the state,” 292 they should uphold that same principle for primaryschool education.
The Justices, however, were quick to refute this argument,
pointing out that “before the statute was passed, [the state of Texas]
received federal funds based in part on the enrollment which included
illegal, undocumented children.” 293 Therefore, it would be “pretty
hard” for Mr. Hardy to argue “that the federal government has some
rule” barring alien children from attending public schools “when it
actually paid” the state of Texas federal funding based, in part, on the
enrollment of said “illegal, undocumented children.” 294
The Justices followed this line of questioning by asking whether
the state of Texas could “deny [the noncitizen children] fire
protection,” 295 to which Mr. Hardy responded, “I think that they are
afforded all the due process procedures and the other problems that
are attributable to that. We are not talking about denying them all
rights. I am talking and attempting to talk about the resident and nonresident,” 296 at which point he was interrupted. The interruption came
from a Justice contending that “you are talking about denying them
all rights that every other similarly situated person has, such as fire
protection, police protection, garbage collection, things like that. You
could take all those things away, it seems to me, under the state’s
argument.” 297 As demonstrated by the pointed comments from the
Justices, both advocates for the appellants in Plyler v. Doe struggled to
provide truly valid reasons for section 21.031.
Advocates for the appellees endeavored to point out the flaws in
the appellants’ logic; for example, Peter Schey raised the fact that “the
state of Texas seems to argue that it is in a highly unique situation and
they downplay the importance of this problem to states like California,
et cetera.” 298 As Mr. Schey argued, Texas was not the only state facing
a large influx of noncitizen immigration, therefore its argument that

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 25:12.
Id. at 26:56.
Id. at 27:22.
Id. at 29:06.
Id. at 30:03.
Id. at 30:20.
Id. at 39:12.
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section 21.031 of title II was created to help preserve resources and
stop schools’ population from increasing was not a valid one.
The appellees’ other advocate, Peter Roos, used an approach
similar to the one we take in this Article to demonstrate why section
21.031 was unconstitutional. He explained that the Equal Protection
Clause “is to be contrasted historically with the clause that . . . grants
privileges and immunities to citizens.”299 He continued by saying that
the Court has said the Equal Protection Clause “include[s]
undocumented persons, because they are indeed persons.” 300 He then,
as we have in this Article, set forth a legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, arguing, “The primary framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment clearly thought of, at least in terms of
coverage, of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
as protecting the same group of people.” 301
Mr. Roos also argued that, based on the language of the Equal
Protection Clause and the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, “absent the right of coverage under the Equal Protection
Clause, the state could . . . treat undocumented people arbitrarily and
irrationally.” 302 He then posed a question that we, too, have
considered: “What would be the limitations upon a state should there
not be the minimal protection of the Equal Protection Clause?” 303 Mr.
Roos’s bold statement drives home the message that we have sought
to convey throughout this Article: the Texas statute barring the
children of illegal aliens from attending public school was
unconstitutional due to the original framing, conception, and
application of the Equal Protection Clause.
Texas could not have made any claim during the oral arguments
for Plyler vs. Doe that would have proved the 1975 regulation
constitutional. The original language of the Texas Constitution does
299. Id. at 1:06:38.
300. Id. at 1:06:57.
301. Id. at 1:07:26. He even mentions Representative Bingham and Senator Howard: “In
our brief, we cite to Representative Bingham, who was commonly acknowledged to be the
author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he spoke of the due process and equal
protection clauses alike as protecting the citizen and the stranger.” Id. at 1:07:40.
Likewise, on the floor of the Senate, the floor manager was Senator Howard, and
Senator Howard spoke of the two clauses in terms of coverage in the same words, and
spoke of them together, and when he spoke of them, he spoke of them as protecting
whomever should be within the country.
Id. at 1:08:32.
302. Id. at 1:08:55 (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 1:09:17.
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not exclude alien children from the state’s public school system, and
in fact covers mainly funding and land usage, except when stipulating
that segregation is necessary. Of course, article VII had been amended
since 1876; however, none of those amendments mention alienage.
Nowhere in article VII are the children of illegal aliens discussed, and
certainly nowhere in article VII are they barred from attending public
schools in Texas. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the highest law of the land, provides “persons,” i.e., aliens
and citizens alike, with due process and equal protection of the laws.
Therefore, the 1975 statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment—
alien children are “protected” under the Texas Constitution, which
does not explicitly, or even implicitly, ban alien children from
attending public schools.
IV. OTHER FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ALIENAGE CASES
The preceding Parts establish a new, originalist public meaning
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and
have explained how the Equal Protection Clause applies to aliens, both
legal and illegal, within the United States. We now apply this
scholarship to other alienage cases in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was the basis for the decision. The relevant cases 304 are as
follows: Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 305 Truax v. Raich, 306 Takahashi v. Fish &

304. Scholars of immigration and/or alienage case law will notice that a seminal alienage
case, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), is missing from our discussion. Under
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chinese noncitizens were required to obtain a certificate of
residence to continue living in the United States, so when the plaintiff, Fong Yue Ting, did not
have this certificate, he was arrested. A judge ordered that he be deported immediately, so he
appealed the decision. Ultimately, the Supreme Court (split 6–3) decided that the national
government had an “absolute and unqualified” right to oversee the immigration process,
including deportation of immigrants already living in the United States. The dissent stated that,
while Congress does have the authority to create new immigration requirements, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to any person residing in the country, and
immigrants should be allowed to challenge a deportation order. We disagree with the decision
in Fong Yue Ting and believe the dissent to be the better part of the argument. As such, we did
not want to include this case in our discussion of alienage cases that would be better served
through an originalist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. See NEUMAN, supra note 173, at
62, 120–21.
305. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (whether Chinese immigrants could operate laundry businesses
in California).
306. 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (whether Arizona could bar aliens from employment).
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Game Commission, 307 Graham v. Richardson, 308 Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 309 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 310 and Arizona v. United States. 311
We agree with the outcome of these decisions but believe the
reasoning of each would have been stronger if articulated using our
originalist equal protection reading that aliens fall under the category
of “any person” (according to the 1848 Webster’s Dictionary
definition of the words “any” and “person”) and have a constitutional
right to the equal protection of the law and to due process of law.
We will briefly outline each case and explain how our reading
better suits the circumstances. In most of these cases, the aliens serving
as petitioners are “legal aliens” as opposed to Plyler v. Doe’s illegal
aliens. However, as explained in Part II, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was written, there was no federal concept of legal
alienage versus illegal alienage. Therefore, we believe that, for our
argument, the distinction of “legal” versus “illegal” does not matter.
We are not arguing that the rights that emerged from the following
cases should be conferred upon illegal aliens; we are simply pointing
out that each case could benefit from the application of originalism.
A. Yick Wo v. Hopkins
The earliest case to come before the Supreme Court that dealt
explicitly with alien rights was Yick Wo v. Hopkins, decided in 1886.
Yick Wo, a Chinese man living in California, petitioned the Supreme
Court of California for a writ of habeas corpus after being wrongfully
imprisoned in San Francisco for violating ordinances. 312 The ordinance
in question established that no person could operate a laundry in a
wooden building without a permit from the Board of Supervisors, but
the Board granted no permits to any Chinese person who applied
307. 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (whether California could deny fishing licenses to individuals
who are ineligible to U.S. citizenship).
308. 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (whether Arizona could deny welfare benefits to aliens who had
not lived in the state for a certain number of years and Pennsylvania could deny welfare benefits
to any aliens).
309. 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (whether the Federal Civil Service Commission could bar aliens
from working for the Federal Civil Service).
310. 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (whether New York could require that resident aliens apply for
U.S. citizenship before becoming eligible for education-based financial aid).
311. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (whether four different provisions of an Arizona state law
were preempted by federal immigration law).
312. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356–57 (1886).
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while simultaneously denying permits to only one of eighty nonChinese applicants. 313 Yick Wo was imprisoned for refusing to pay a
ten-dollar fine, which he incurred for continuing to operate his
business without a permit. 314 The Supreme Court did not deal with
the writ but instead answered the question of whether the statute was
discriminatory. 315 The Court concluded that the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause and struck it down as unconstitutional. 316
Interestingly, the argument that Justice T. Stanley Matthews used
in his opinion, written for a unanimous Court, is quite similar to our
originalist approach (due probably to the fact that Carolene Products
would not be decided for another fifty years). He explained:
The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of
which they complain, are not less, because they are aliens and
subjects of the Emperor of China. By the third article of the treaty
between this Government and that of China, concluded November
17, 1880, 22 Stat. 827, it is stipulated: “If Chinese laborers, or
Chinese of any other class, now either permanently or temporarily
residing in the territory of the United States, meet with ill treatment
at the hands of any other persons, the Government of the United
States will exert all its powers to devise measures for their protection,
and to secure to them the same rights, privileges, immunities and
exemptions as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most
favored nation, and to which they are entitled by treaty.”
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined
to the protection of citizens. It says: “Nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” These provisions are universal in their application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. . . .
The questions we have to consider and decide in these cases,
therefore, are to be treated as involving the rights of every citizen of

313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 359–60.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 366–68.
Id. at 374.
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the United States equally with those of the strangers and aliens who
now invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 317

Justice Matthews recognized in 1886, only twenty years after the
Fourteenth Amendment’s inception, what we are trying to emphasize
130 years later—the “any person” language of the Equal Protection
Clause applies to literally any being living within the borders of the
United States. He and his colleagues on the Court understood 318 that
the Equal Protection Clause could safeguard aliens as well as citizens
from the inherently racist and anti-alien sentiment behind the
California statute. The Court struck the statute down on originalist
grounds—confirming that the phrase “any person” includes aliens,
not just “citizens”—and set a precedent for using the Fourteenth
Amendment to defend alien rights.
B. Truax v. Raich
The next major immigration case we address is Truax v. Raich,319
a 1915 case examining whether a state could bar aliens from
employment. The state of Arizona passed a law in 1914 that stated:
Any company, corporation, partnership, association or individual
who is, or may hereafter become an employer of more than five (5)
workers at any one time, in the State of Arizona, regardless of kind
or class of work, or sex of workers, shall employ not less than eighty

317. Id. at 368–69.
318. As can be seen near the end of the majority opinion:
No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why [the Chinese
laundry owners] should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed manner,
their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And
while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred
others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty
others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar
conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and
the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the
race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law
is not justified. The discrimination is, therefore illegal, and the public administration
which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Id. at 374.
319. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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(80) percent qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United
States or some subdivision thereof. 320

Mike Raich, an Austrian immigrant whom the Supreme Court
described as “an inhabitant of the State of Arizona but not a qualified
elector,” 321 was fired from his job as a cook by his employer, William
Truax, after the Arizona law was passed. Prior to the passage of the
law, Raich had worked for Truax without problem, but after the law’s
enactment, Truax informed Raich that he would be fired “by reason
of [the law’s] requirements and because of the fear of the penalties
that would be incurred in case of its violation.” 322 The issue was
“whether the act assailed [was] repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment,” 323 and the Supreme Court ruled that it was.
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing for an eight-Justice
majority, penned the opinion of the Court. He explained:
Upon the allegations of the bill, it must be assumed that the
complainant, a native of Austria, has been admitted to the United
States under the Federal law. He was thus admitted with the privilege
of entering and abiding in the United States, and hence of entering
and abiding in any State in the Union. Being lawfully an inhabitant
of Arizona, the complainant is entitled under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the equal protection of its laws. The description—
“any person within its jurisdiction”—as it has frequently been held,
includes aliens. 324

Justice Hughes then cited Yick Wo, discussed above, to prove that
the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to aliens. He framed his
argument using the Fourteenth Amendment and explained that
Arizona could not use “within its jurisdiction” philosophy to justify
its discrimination against immigrants:
It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the
State to make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the
health, safety, morals and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But
this admitted authority, with the broad range of legislative discretion
that it implies, does not go so far as to make it possible for the State

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the
ordinary means of earning a livelihood. 325

Moving away from the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Hughes
stated, “The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude
aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government.” 326 Since aliens
“cannot live where they cannot work,” 327 “[t]he assertion of an
authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood
when lawfully admitted to the State would be tantamount to the
assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode . . . .” 328 To
synthesize the various parts of this argument, Justice Hughes held that
the Arizona statute was unconstitutional because: a) under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Arizona had to provide for the welfare of
any persons within its jurisdiction because the Fourteenth Amendment
was applicable to aliens following the decision in Yick Wo; and b) by
denying legal aliens the opportunity to work, Arizona was inherently
denying them the ability to live in the state and was therefore usurping
the federal government’s authority to “admit or exclude aliens.” 329
While this reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is in line with
our originalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, there is
one major difference between our understanding of the clause and
Justice Hughes’s reasoning: Mike Raich was a legal immigrant in the
United States, and as such, the opinion was written to reflect the fact
that Arizona could not bar legal aliens from finding work in the state.
Justice Hughes’s opinion, which protects legal aliens under the Equal
Protection Clause, differs from our interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause because, as we have discussed throughout this
Article, we believe the Equal Protection Clause protects all aliens in
this country regardless of their “legal immigration” status. 330
Justice James Clark McReynolds was the lone dissenter—he
believed that under the Eleventh Amendment the Supreme Court had
no right to rule in Truax. 331 However, that dissent has no bearing on

325. Id. at 41.
326. Id. at 42.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 34.
330. See discussion supra Section II.E.
331. Justice McReynolds was so firm in his belief that his dissent was only one paragraph.
He argued that federal courts cannot get involved if a citizen or noncitizen sues a state as a whole
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whether Arizona’s anti-immigrant employment law was in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. As Justice Hughes and his majority
brethren explained, Arizona’s refusal to allow immigrants to live
within its jurisdiction was both a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and a usurpation of the federal government’s authority
over the admittance of aliens.
C. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission
Next on our timeline comes Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Commission, a California case decided thirty-five years after Truax.
The Court decided the case in 1948—after Carolene Products had
been penned—but used equal- protection logic similar to our own.
Torao Takahashi came to the United States from Japan, became a
resident of California in 1907, and used commercial fishing licenses
issued by the state to fish for profit. 332 In 1943, during World War II
and a period of intense anti-Japanese sentiment, The California State
Legislature adopted section 990 of the California Fish and Game
Code to prohibit the issuance of licenses to the “alien Japanese.”333
When Takahashi applied for a license in 1945, he was denied.
The statute was applied unfairly to deliberately harm aliens,
violating the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Hugo Black delivered
the majority opinion and explained, in essence, that aliens fall under
the concept of any person, the argument that we have made
throughout this Article. He stated:
It does not follow, as California seems to argue, that because the
United States regulates immigration and naturalization in part on
the basis of race and color classifications, a state can adopt one or
more of the same classifications to prevent lawfully admitted aliens
within its borders from earning a living in the same way that other
state inhabitants earn their living. 334

entity and decided that Mike Raich had brought suit against Arizona as a whole by questioning
the constitutionality of its law. However, Mike Raich brought suit against his employer, William
Truax, Sr., and not the state of Arizona as a whole; as such, the Eleventh Amendment was
inapposite and Justice McReynolds’s dissent did not hold any water. Arizona’s anti-immigrant
employment law was clearly in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
332. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 412–13 (1948).
333. Id. at 413.
334. Id. at 418–19.
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Justice Black pointed out that “the Federal Government has broad
constitutional powers in determining” immigration processes, and
that “Congress, in the enactment of a comprehensive legislative plan
for the nation-wide control and regulation of immigration and
naturalization, has broadly provided” 335 that “[a]ll persons within the
jurisdictions of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 336 He continued
that the congressional statute—and its framing document, the Equal
Protection Clause—is meant to protect both aliens and citizens:
The protection of this section has been held to extend to aliens as
well as to citizens. Consequently the section and the Fourteenth
Amendment on which it rests in part protect “all persons” against
state legislation bearing unequally upon them either because of
alienage or color. The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted
under its authority thus embody a general policy that all persons
lawfully in this country shall abide “in any state” on an equality of
legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws. 337

According to Justice Black, California had to grant a fishing permit
to Takahashi because, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s “any
person” language, the law barring him from receiving a permit failed
to equally grant permits to non-aliens and aliens who were legally
within California’s borders. 338 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
laws must apply equally to all people, so the California Fish and Game
Commission’s statute barring only Japanese individuals from obtaining
a fishing permit was unconstitutional.
Aside from Justice Black’s majority opinion, Justice Frank Murphy
wrote a concurrence. Justice Murphy wrote of his concern that “§ 990
of the California Fish and Game Code, barring those ineligible to
citizenship from securing commercial fishing licenses, is the direct
outgrowth of antagonism toward persons of Japanese ancestry.” 339
Murphy argued that “[t]he statute in question is but one more
manifestation of the anti-Japanese fever which has been evident in
335. Id. at 419.
336. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 41 (1946)).
337. Id. at 419–20 (internal citations omitted).
338. Again, we are not discussing, disputing, or trying to reconfigure the concept of
“legal” versus “illegal” aliens in this case or any other.
339. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).
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California in varying degree since the turn of the century,” 340 and that
“[n]o pretense was made that this alternation was in the interests
of conservation.” 341
Justice Murphy purported that this racist law was created “to
discourage the return to California of Japanese aliens,” 342 and he used
this race-based examination of section 990 to conclude that “[t]he
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not
permit a state to discriminate against resident aliens in such a fashion,
whether the purpose be to give effect to racial animosity or to protect
the competitive interests of other residents.” 343 To Justice Murphy, the
racial aspect of section 990 was what violated the Equal Protection
Clause as opposed to the “discriminatory against aliens” argument
used in Justice Black’s majority opinion. 344
Justice Stanley F. Reed wrote a dissent joined by Justice Robert
H. Jackson. Justice Reed believed that California’s anti-immigrant
fishing law was constitutional for the following reason:
As fishing rights have been treated traditionally as a natural resource,
in the absence of federal regulation, California as a sovereign state
has power to regulate the taking and handling of fish in the waters
bordering its shores. It is, I think, one of the natural resources of the
state that may be preserved from exploitation by aliens. The ground
for this power in the absence of any exercise of federal authority is
California’s authority over its fisheries.
The right to fish is analogous to the right to own land, a privilege
which a state may deny to aliens as to land within its borders. It is
closely akin to the right to hunt, a privilege from which a state may
bar aliens, if reasonably deemed advantageous to its citizens. 345

The argument that California has sovereign control over its waters
and its fishing practices carries some weight; however, the question in
Takahashi was not whether California had the constitutional right to
regulate the use of its fishing grounds. Rather, the issue was whether
Takahashi should have been granted a commercial fishing license and

340. Id.
341. Id. at 424.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 425.
344. It is worth noting that Justice Murphy’s conclusion is particularly strong: “We need
but unbutton the seemingly innocent words of § 990 to discover beneath them the very negation
of all the ideals of the equal protection clause.” Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
345. Id. at 427–28 (internal citations omitted).
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therefore whether section 990 of the California Fish and Game Code
was unconstitutional. Justice Reed’s argument was certainly antiimmigrant in sentiment, but his precedent-based argument regarding
a state’s ability to provide some rights exclusively for its citizens was
not necessarily a fallacious one. Justice Reed’s logic was simply
inapplicable to the facts.
The purpose of section 990 was to specifically bar Japanese
immigrants from obtaining commercial fishing licenses. The
reasoning for this ban was explained as racism in Justice Murphy’s
concurrence and anti-immigrant sentiment in Justice Black’s opinion.
Section 990 was not conferring some special privilege upon all
California citizens, as Justice Reed claimed in his dissent; any nonJapanese immigrant could still obtain a commercial fishing license.
Had section 990 discriminated against all immigrants, Takahashi
would have been a very different case indeed (though, perhaps, still
unconstitutional if viewed through our understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause). Instead, the statute only targeted Japanese
immigrants, and thus Justice Reed’s argument—that California was
following the ideology that “[c]itizens have rights superior to those of
aliens in the ownership of land and in exploiting natural
resources” 346—is untenable. The discriminatory statute barring
Takahashi from obtaining a commercial fishing license was clearly in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the law did not apply
to all persons in California in the same manner.
D. Graham v. Richardson
Twenty-three years later, Graham v. Richardson dealt with two
related anti-alien welfare statutes in Arizona and Pennsylvania. 347 In
Arizona, aliens could obtain certain welfare benefits only after meeting
a fifteen-year residency requirement, while Pennsylvania denied
“general assistance” to aliens. 348 Carmen Richardson, a legal alien who

346. Id. at 429.
347. 403 U.S. 365, 365 (1971).
348. Id. at 366–68.
This case, from Pennsylvania, concerns that portion of a general assistance program
that is not federally supported. The relevant statute is § 432 (2) of the Pennsylvania
Public Welfare Code, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 62, § 432 (2) (1968), originally enacted in
1939. It provides that those eligible for assistance shall be (1) needy persons who
qualify under the federally supported categorical assistance programs and (2) those
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became disabled while living in Arizona, was denied welfare assistance
because she did not meet the residency requirement; 349 Elsie Mary
Jane Leger was a legal alien from Scotland who had been living in
Pennsylvania since 1965 but was denied “public assistance” due to her
alien status. 350 In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Blackmun,
the Court declared the statutes unconstitutional because neither
Arizona nor Pennsylvania could establish a rational basis for creating
two classes of needy persons—aliens versus citizens. 351
Although Justice Blackmun’s argument was based in Carolene
Products’ equal-protection logic, he acknowledged that the “any
person” language of the Equal Protection Clause applies to aliens. He
stated, “Under traditional equal protection principles, a State retains
broad discretion to classify as long as its classification has a reasonable
basis. But the Court’s decisions have established that classifications
based on alienage . . . are inherently suspect and subject to close
judicial scrutiny.” 352
Given that “classifications based on alienage” are “subject to close
judicial scrutiny,” Justice Blackmun argued, Arizona’s and
Pennsylvania’s “restrictions” are, in kind, subject to close judicial
scrutiny. 353 The states both sought “to justify their restrictions” on
aliens’ eligibility for public assistance “solely on the basis of a State’s
‘special public interest’ in favoring its own citizens over aliens” when
distributing “limited resources such as welfare benefits.” 354 The Court
determined that this reasoning failed the rational basis test. 355 Arizona

other needy persons who are citizens of the United States. Assistance to the latter
group is funded wholly by the Commonwealth.
Id. at 368.
349. Id. at 367.
350. Id. at 369.
351. Id. at 372–73.
352. Id. at 371–72 (internal citations omitted). Justice Blackmun even quotes Takahashi,
saying, “Accordingly, it was said in Takahashi, that ‘the power of a state to apply its laws
exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits.’” Id. at 372 (internal
citation omitted).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Justice Blackmun wrote:
Whatever may be the contemporary vitality of the special public-interest doctrine
in other contexts after Takahashi, we conclude that a State’s desire to preserve limited
welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify Pennsylvania’s making
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and Pennsylvania could not use their “desire to preserve limited
welfare benefits” for their own citizens to justify barring noncitizen
residents from accessing those benefits.
This rational-basis argument makes some sense if one understands
Supreme Court precedent, but the argument is not defensible because
the term “rational basis” is vague. It is difficult to uniformly define
what qualifies as a “rational basis” for discrimination, and the
argument that “classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny” 356 means little from a constitutional standpoint. Labeling
aliens a “suspect class” is arbitrary and therefore does not indicate
anything about their constitutional rights. One justice might believe
laws based on alienage worthy of “strict scrutiny,” but another might
disagree. With our originalist approach, it is much easier to establish
that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to
aliens (regardless of “legal” or “illegal” classification) the right to
equal protection of the laws and then to apply that principle to specific
situations. In the case of Graham v. Richardson, the two welfare laws
clearly did not protect aliens in the same manner that they protected
citizens, and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause. This
originalist argument is much clearer than the rational basis test and
follows a set of guidelines that can be applied in the same manner to
similar cases.
E. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong
The next case, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 357 was decided under
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was incorporated into the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in Bolling v. Sharpe. 358 After
noncitizens ineligible for public assistance, and Arizona’s restricting benefits to
citizens and longtime resident aliens.
Id. at 374.
356. Id. at 372.
357. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
358. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling, decided in 1954, was a civil rights
case that addressed whether segregated public schools in Washington, DC, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Brown v. Board of Education, decided the same day
as Bolling, the Supreme Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.” Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954). The Fifth Amendment, though, “does not contain an
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Bolling, the Fifth Amendment is read in a way that “reverse
incorporates” the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
into the Fifth Amendment under principles of substantive due process.
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, decided in 1976, “each of the five
plaintiffs was denied federal employment solely because of his or her
alienage.” 359 Mow Sun Wong, who had worked as an electrical
engineer in China, was “ineligible for employment as a janitor for the
General Services Administration” because he was not a citizen of the
United States. 360 He and four other plaintiffs filed suit against the
Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission,
complaining that “about 300,000 federal jobs become available each
year, but noncitizens are not permitted to compete for those jobs
except in rare situations when citizens are not available or when a few
positions exempted from the competitive civil service are being
filled.” 361 The issue was whether “the advantage given to citizens
seeking federal civil service positions is arbitrary, and violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . .” 362 In a 5–4 decision,
the Supreme Court decided that the Fifth Amendment had, in fact,
been violated. Justice Stevens employed the rational basis, or “levels
of scrutiny,” test to make this decision, writing,

equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states,”
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499, so the Court had to find some way to incorporate its new equal
protection doctrine into a provision that was applicable on the federal level.
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, “the concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive,” explaining that “this
Court has recognized [that] discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process.” Id. (citing for support Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); and Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)). He
continued his argument using Fourteenth Amendment rational-basis logic, stating, “Segregation
in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it
imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.” Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
Finally, he incorporated Fourteenth Amendment thinking into the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause by declaring, “In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states
from maintaining racially segregated public schools [because of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause and the rational basis test], it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.” Id.
359. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 91.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 92.
362. Id. at 92–93.
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[i]ndeed, we deal with a rule which deprives a discrete class of
persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis. By reason of
the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must be accompanied by
due process. It follows that some judicial scrutiny of the deprivation
is mandated by the Constitution. 363

Justice Stevens examined the various reasons for these
discriminatory laws as provided by the Civil Service Commission—
some of which include the claim that “the citizenship requirement has
been imposed in the United States with substantial consistency for
over 100 years” 364 and reliance on a presidential executive order that
allowed the Civil Service Commission to establish standards for hiring
employees. 365 He then declared, “[A]ssuming . . . that the national
interests identified by the petitioners would adequately support an
explicit determination by Congress or the President to exclude all
noncitizens from the federal service, we conclude that those interests
cannot provide an acceptable rationalization for such a determination
by the Civil Service Commission.” 366
Justice Stevens reached this conclusion by explaining that “the
impact of the rule on the millions of lawfully admitted resident aliens”
was “precisely the same” as the impact of “comparable state rules”
which the Supreme Court invalidated in Sugarman v. Dougall. 367 He
then went so far as to say that the Civil Service Commission’s rule
requiring citizenship “deprives its members of an aspect of liberty”
because the citizenship requirement barred legal aliens from a job with
the Civil Service! 368
Justice Stevens finished his argument by noting that the legal
aliens “were admitted as a result of decisions made by the Congress
and the President, implemented by the Immigration and

363. Id. at 102–03.
364. Id. at 104.
365. Id. at 111.
366. Id. at 116.
367. Id. The background for the Sugarman case is similar to that of Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong: the plaintiffs brought suit because they were excluded from competitive civil service
positions in New York City. As this case involved a state government, the Supreme Court was
able to employ Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection logic to overturn the case. See
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, because the suit
involved the national government, Fifth Amendment substantive-due-process logic had to
be used.
368. Hampton, 426 U.S at 116.
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Naturalization Service acting under the Attorney General of the
United States,” 369 so any “decision to impose that deprivation of an
important liberty” had to be made “at a comparable level of
government” to satisfy due-process requirements. 370 Justice Stevens
held that the Civil Service Commission’s job was not to decide
whether aliens could reside and work legally in the United States, and,
therefore, they could not unilaterally bar legal aliens from working for
the Civil Service. 371
As with the other alienage cases discussed in this Section, we do
not disagree with Justice Stevens’s decision and believe that
noncitizens should be hired by the Civil Service Commission and
allowed to work for the Civil Service. An originalist reading of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, however, would have been more
effective. Justice Stevens based his reasoning on a “judicial scrutiny”
test, which seems to mean that he considered each justification for the
Civil Service Commission’s discrimination against noncitizens and
decided, based on those justifications, whether the discrimination was
constitutional. Justice Stevens never defined what, exactly, the varying
levels of scrutiny were for purposes of the anti-immigrant
discrimination present in Hampton, and used only rational-basis ideas
to explain why Fifth Amendment substantive due process applies to
noncitizens. His scrutiny-based, argument-by-argument approach
could be easily torn apart by critics—or any of the four Justices who
dissented in Hampton—because his logic explaining why the Fifth
Amendment applies to immigrant citizens is lacking.
However, Justice Stevens’s final statement, “By broadly denying
this class substantial opportunities for employment, the Civil Service
Commission rule deprives its members of an aspect of liberty,”372
seems more in line with originalist thought. The Fifth Amendment
reads, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law,” 373 so by directly addressing the

369. Id. at 116.
370. Id. If you think this is somewhat of a convoluted argument, we do too! That is why
we would rather these Equal Protection immigration cases be decided using our originalist and
textualist approach.
371. Id. If, instead of a “comparable level of government,” id., the Civil Service
Commission could make the decision to deprive the legal aliens of their liberty to work for the
Civil Service, that decision was to be “justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that
agency.” Id.
372. Id.
373. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
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deprivation of noncitizens’ liberty present in Hampton, Justice Stevens
made clear that the Civil Service Commission had violated the Fifth
Amendment. Had he undertaken an originalist reading of the Fifth
Amendment in the same way we conducted one for the Fourteenth
Amendment, his opinion would have been much stronger. If Justice
Stevens had explicitly stated in his opinion that immigrant workers
qualify as “persons” under the “[n]o person shall” portion of the Fifth
Amendment, he would have set a clear precedent for future Justices
to follow: noncitizens are still “persons” for questions of Fifth
Amendment rights as well as Fourteenth Amendment due process and
equal protection issues. Instead, he relied on murky, Lochnerian
rational-basis reasoning to strike down the Civil Service Commission’s
anti-immigrant regulations, skirting around the issue of Fifth
Amendment rights as granted to noncitizens.
F. Nyquist v. Mauclet
The last alienage case before Plyler v. Doe, was the case most
factually related to Plyler because it, too, dealt with education. Nyquist
v. Mauclet374 involved a New York statute that barred certain aliens
from state financial assistance for higher education. 375 A resident alien
from France named Jean-Marie Mauclet, who was married to and had
a child with a United States citizen, was denied tuition assistance at
the State University of New York at Buffalo because he refused to
apply for U.S. citizenship at the time of his tuition application—he
wished to reside permanently in the United States but retain his
French citizenship. 376 The Supreme Court recognized that this statute
was wrongfully discriminatory but based its decision on the rational
basis test.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated, “The Court has
ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are
‘inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.’” 377 The
phrase “close judicial scrutiny,” as written in Graham v. Richardson
and interpreted again here, refers to what is, in modern-day
Fourteenth Amendment scholarship, the “strict scrutiny”
classification. As explained earlier, the rational basis test asks whether

374.
375.
376.
377.
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432 U.S. 1, 1 (1977).
Id. at 4–5.
Id.
Id. at 7 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
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a state has a “rational basis” for making a law perceived as
discriminatory. Under this test, certain types of discrimination
merit certain types of “scrutiny” to determine whether they
are unconstitutional.
Justice Blackmun applied this test in Mauclet and found that,
because “resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the
taxes that support the assistance programs,” there is “no real
unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to participate in
programs to which they contribute on an equal basis.” 378 And if aliens
can participate equally in programs they pay for, there is no rational
basis for denying them financial aid to attend a public university. In
other words, “The State surely is not harmed by providing resident
aliens the same educational opportunity it offers to others.” 379 If the
resident aliens had to pay taxes equal to those of citizens, the law had
to be applied equally to them under the Equal Protection Clause,
according to Justice Blackmun’s “rational basis” test.
However, as explained in our discussion of Graham v. Richardson,
it makes little sense to hinge an argument upon the shaky and easily
misinterpreted rational basis test. While the Nyquist Court held that
New York had no rational reason to exclude resident aliens from its
higher-education tuition-assistance programs, opponents of the case
could claim that New York had no fiscal responsibility for these aliens
and that their home country should provide them with tuition aid.380
Had Nyquist v. Mauclet been decided using our originalist argument—
that in 1866 the Equal Protection Clause applied to aliens and even

378. Id. at 12.
379. Id.
380. Justice Blackmun does in fact address this concern at the very end of the decision by
explaining that resident aliens pay taxes to the United States government, though we still believe
that he should have just used our originalist method from the start. He says,
Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the
assistance programs. There thus is no real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an
equal right to participate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis. And
although an alien may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may
play a role—perhaps even a leadership role—in other areas of import to the
community. The State surely is not harmed by providing resident aliens the same
educational opportunity it offers to others.
Since we hold that the challenged statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal-protection guarantee, we need not reach appellees’ claim that it also intrudes
upon Congress’ comprehensive authority over immigration and naturalization.
Id.
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today all aliens deserve equal protection of a state’s laws—the Court
could have explained that the New York statute barring certain aliens
from state tuition assistance did not equally protect the citizens
and aliens “within its jurisdiction,” and, consequently, was
clearly unconstitutional.
G. Arizona v. United States
Though Arizona v. United States 381 took place years after Plyler v.
Doe, it is a seminal immigration case and should be included in any
discussion of immigration issues addressed by the Supreme Court.
The issue in Arizona was a 2010 Arizona state law called the “Support
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” (referred to as
S.B. 1070). Its purpose was to “establish an official state policy of
‘attrition through enforcement.’” 382 The Court scrutinized four
provisions of the law: one creating a state offense for being unlawfully
present in the United States (section 3 of S.B. 1070); a second
creating a state offense for working or seeking work while not
authorized to do so (section 5(C)); a third requiring state and local
officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was
lawfully arrested or detained (section 2(B)); and a fourth authorizing
the warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the
United States (section 6). 383
In a 5–3 decision (Justice Kagan recused herself), the Supreme
Court held that the first, second, and fourth provisions were
preempted by federal law, but the third provision was not. Justice
Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, explained, “The federal
power to determine immigration policy is well settled. Immigration
policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations
for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of
aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its laws.” 384 He
noted, “Federal governance of immigration and alien status is
extensive and complex. Congress has specified categories of aliens who
may not be admitted to the United States. Unlawful entry and
381. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
382. Id. at 2497.
383. Id. at 2497–98. The district court issued a preliminary injunction to stop these four
notably anti-immigrant statutes, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision. Arizona then appealed its case to the Supreme Court.
384. Id. at 2499.
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unlawful reentry into the country are federal offenses,” 385 and
“[r]emoval is a civil, not criminal, matter. A principal feature of the
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration
officials,” 386 making Arizona’s attempt to regulate illegal
immigration within its borders and remove aliens from the United
States unnecessary.
Regarding provision three, however, Justice Kennedy began by
stating, “Consultation between federal and state officials is an
important feature of the immigration system,” 387 indicating that the
provision allowing state and local police officers to check the
immigration status of already-arrested or already-detained individuals
might be constitutional.
He continued, “Congress has done nothing to suggest it is
inappropriate to communicate with ICE [U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement] in these situations, however. 388 Indeed, it has
encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration
violations.” 389 Justice Kennedy said that provision three was not
preempted by the federal government, but rather “encouraged”: if
state and local police officers help identify illegal immigrants via
background checks on individuals they have already arrested or
detained, that information is useful to the federal government. In
other words, “The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy
requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.”390

385. Id. at 2499–2500.
386. Id. at 2500.
387. Id. at 2509.
388. The word “however” was used here because, as Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority
opinion, “The United States argues that making status verification mandatory interferes with
the federal immigration scheme.” Id. Provision three “does not allow state officers to consider
federal enforcement priorities in deciding whether to contact ICE about someone they have
detained. In other words, the officers must make an inquiry even in cases where it seems unlikely
that the Attorney General would have the alien removed.” Id. (citation omitted). Kennedy’s
argument rests on the fact that, contrary to the United States’ argument, ICE and Congress have
actually “encouraged” state and local law enforcement to provide information to ICE in order
to alert ICE to “possible immigration violations.”
389. Id.
390. Id. The full quote, which explains “the federal scheme,” is as follows:
Congress has done nothing to suggest it is inappropriate to communicate with
ICE in these situations, however. Indeed, it has encouraged the sharing of information
about possible immigration violations. See 8 U. S. C. §1357(g) (10)(A). A federal
statute regulating the public benefits provided to qualified aliens in fact instructs that
“no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from
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Therefore, provision three of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 was constitutional
even though provisions one, two, and four were not.
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito all concurred in part and
dissented in part, though each Justice concurred with different
provisions and wrote his own concurrence. Justice Scalia argued that
federal law preempted none of the four provisions, stating, “Today’s
opinion . . . deprives States of what most would consider the defining
characteristic of sovereignty: the power to exclude from the
sovereign’s territory people who have no right to be there.” 391 He
continued his discussion of sovereignty, saying, “As a sovereign,
Arizona has the inherent power to exclude persons for its territory,
subject only to those limitations expressed in the Constitution or
constitutionally imposed by Congress. That power to exclude has long
been recognized as inherent in sovereignty.” 392 Justice Scalia then
embarked on an originalist journey through legislative history and
legal precedent, declaring, “after the adoption of the Constitution
there was some doubt about the power of the Federal Government to
control immigration, but no doubt about the power of the States to
do so.” 393 His focus on state sovereignty was not echoed in the
concurrences of Justices Thomas or Alito, however.
Justice Thomas stated that all four provisions of S.B. 1070 were
constitutional because “there is no conflict between the ‘ordinary
meanin[g]’ of the relevant federal laws and that of the four provisions
of Arizona law at issue here.” 394 He systematically explained how each
provision and its corresponding federal laws have the same “ordinary
meaning” (i.e. “original meaning,” in the sense that we have
employed that term in this Article). He also addressed the majority’s
contention that several provisions of the Arizona law were
preempted—because they “stan[d] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

sending to or receiving from [ICE] information regarding the immigration status,
lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.” §1644. The federal scheme thus
leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.
Id.
391. Id. at 2512 (Scalia J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 2517.
394. Id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 588 (2009)).
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Congress” 395: “[T]he ‘purposes and objectives’ theory of implied preemption is inconsistent with the Constitution because it invites courts
to engage in freewheeling speculation about congressional purpose
that roams well beyond statutory text.” 396
Justice Thomas’s unyielding stance did not appeal to Justice Alito,
who strayed from the path forged by his two fellow dissenters when
holding in his concurrence that the majority had decided correctly for
provisions one and three but incorrectly for provisions two and four.397
Alito agrees that provision three was not preempted because “[t]hat
provision does not authorize or require Arizona law enforcement
officers to do anything they are not already allowed to do under
existing federal law.” 398 Similarly, Justice Alito believed provision one
was also preempted
by virtue of our decision in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1942).
Our conclusion in that case that Congress had enacted an “allembracing system” of alien registration and that States cannot
“enforce additional or auxiliary regulations,” id. at 66–67, forecloses
Arizona’s attempt here to impose additional, state-law penalties for
violations of the federal registration scheme. 399

However, Justice Alito says, “I part ways on [provisions two and
four],” and argues that, in his view, both of those provisions of
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 were in fact constitutional and not preempted by
federal law. 400 He explains:
The Court’s holding on [provision two] is inconsistent with De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), which held that employment
regulation, even of aliens unlawfully present in the country, is an area
of traditional state concern. Because state police powers are
implicated here, our precedents require us to presume that federal
law does not displace state law unless Congress’ intent to do so is
clear and manifest. 401

395. Id. (internal citations omitted).
396. Id. Here, Justice Thomas’s judicial philosophy, which emphasizes the importance of
the original meaning of any text, extends not only to Arizona’s S.B. 1070 but to the entire
“purposes and objectives” theory of federal preemption.
397. Id. at 2525 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
398. Id. at 2525 (alteration in original).
399. Id. at 2525–26.
400. Id. at 2525.
401. Id. at 2526.
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Thus, Justice Alito followed the same federal preemption rhetoric as
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and did not employ the originalist,
based-in-legislative-history philosophy that informed Justices Scalia
and Thomas when crafting their concurrences.
However, all four of these opinions, majority or dissent, are
lacking something: the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Arizona v. United States was not brought to the
Supreme Court as a question of equal-protection violation—the
district court issued its preliminary injunction on the basis of federal
preemption—so it is understandable that the Justices did not base
their reasoning in equal-protection logic. When employing our
originalist reading of the Equal Protection Clause, though, one arrives
at the same conclusion that Justice Kennedy’s majority did: provisions
one, two, and four of S.B. 1070 are unconstitutional while provision
three is constitutional.
Provisions one, two, and four each apply the protection of the laws
in an unequal manner to citizens and noncitizens: S.B. 1070’s
provision one makes it an Arizona state offense to be unlawfully
present in the United States, which immediately makes all illegal aliens
criminals despite the circumstances of their arrival into the United
States; 402 provision two bars all illegal aliens from working or even
looking for work by criminalizing those actions, while citizens and
legal aliens are allowed to pursue a vocation; and provision four
authorizes warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be in the United
States illegally, robbing the noncitizens of basic rights because of mere
suspicion instead of substantiated fact. Provision three does provide
equal protection to both noncitizens and citizens, as it requires state
and local police officers to verify the citizenship status of anyone who
might be lawfully arrested or detained, not just aliens (or individuals
assumed to be aliens).
Provisions one, two, and four of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 treat
noncitizens residing illegally in the United States as a separate class of
people in the eyes of the law, despite our understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause to mean that the equal protection of the laws is
granted to all persons residing in the United States. This violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that provisions one, two, and
four are indeed unconstitutional. An originalist reading of the Equal
402. E.g., what if a young woman was brought against the border illegally as part of a
trafficking operation? That young woman would be the victim of a crime—human trafficking—
and not a criminal herself.
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Protection Clause could easily have substituted for Justice Kennedy’s
convoluted discussion of precedent and federal preemption that was
strongly challenged by the three concurring opinions.
In this analysis of Arizona v. United States, it may seem that we
are arguing that Arizona (and the federal government) may not treat
any person differently even if they are not similarly situated. We do
not wish to argue that point in this Article—our aim here is to prove,
using originalist theory, that the Equal Protection Clause applies to
aliens both legal and illegal. We simply wish to apply this line of
argument to Arizona v. United States as a thought experiment. We
understand that if the Supreme Court had used the rationale explained
above, it would have proved a stark departure from current equalprotection doctrine and could result in hundreds of state and federal
employment and immigration laws being declared unconstitutional!
However, we believe that there is value in following the words of
the Constitution and that there is value in exploring, in an academic
context, how the exact words of the Constitution might shed new
light on particular legal questions (and better protect the rights of the
parties in the cases we have analyzed above). The Constitution is the
foundational document upon which our country’s entire legal
framework is built; if state or federal laws stray too far from its words
and meaning, they should be scrutinized and, potentially,
struck down.
Justice Thomas, a fellow proponent of originalism, agrees with this
line of thinking. In Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American
Railroads, he argued, “We have too long abrogated our duty to
enforce the separation of powers required by our Constitution. . . .
The end result may be trains that run on time (although I doubt it),
but the cost is to our Constitution and the individual liberty it
protects.” 403 Justice Thomas also quoted Alexander Hamilton, who
also seems to have agreed with our reasoning: “It may perhaps be said
that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing
good ones . . . The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a
few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of
preventing a number of bad ones.” 404 In using our originalist reading
of the Equal Protection Clause to “defeat” three provisions of
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, we merely want to ensure that the words of the

403.
404.

135 S. Ct. 1225, 1254–55 (2015).
Id. at 1252 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment are being closely followed
and build a framework to prevent future “bad” provisions
regarding immigration.
In conclusion, and to turn back to this Article’s purpose, each of
the cases we have analyzed here involved statutes that violated the
Equal Protection Clause because they did not apply equally to “any
persons,” aliens, or citizens, that were “within the jurisdiction” of the
state that created them. We agree with each case’s outcome. Had all
of the cases been decided using the argument that we have put forth
in this Article, however, the rights that each decision granted to aliens
in the United States would have been much more secure. The rationalbasis defense introduced to Fourteenth Amendment alienage
scholarship creates a series of classifications that are difficult to follow
and easy to debate. By contrast, our originalist dissection of the
Fourteenth Amendment clearly explains how the Equal Protection
Clause applies to aliens and can be used to protect them from
questionable statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
In 2010, the late Justice Antonin Scalia said, “My burden is not
to show that originalism is perfect, but that it beats the other
alternatives, and that, believe me, is not difficult.” 405 We agree with
Justice Scalia, and hope we have borne that burden well in this Article.
In the case of alienage, it is difficult to secure constitutional rights via
judicial interpretivism because the United States’ attitude toward
aliens is ever-changing—the evolution of federal immigration law over
time is evidence enough of that. Instead, we believe that courts can
use originalism instead of judicial interpretivism to secure
constitutional rights for aliens in the United States, even (and
especially!) if those aliens are the children of “illegal immigrants.”
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment is immutable, and the
definitions of the words at the time of the amendment’s framing and
ratification from 1866–68 cannot possibly change. This immutable
Fourteenth Amendment text, specifically the Equal Protection Clause,
applies to aliens; we demonstrated this by using textualism in Part II

405. Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at University of Virginia School of Law Lecture
Sponsored by the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Freedom of Expression (Apr.
16, 2010), in U. VA. SCHOOL L., (Apr. 20, 2010), http://content.law.virginia.
edu/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm.
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and by supporting that textual analysis with legislative history in Part
III. An originalist reading of the Equal Protection Clause will
withstand the test of time. It is our fervent hope that, whatever
attitude the United States may take toward aliens in the coming years,
an originalist reading of the Equal Protection Clause will be used to
protect the rights of both illegal and legal aliens for the
foreseeable future.
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